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Hope for Temporary Citizens Aboard Floating
Cities: Carlisle v. Carnival Corporation
KRISTOPHER E. PEARSON*
Since most do not live in a tropical paradise, a cruise offers vaca-
tioners a way to escape to exotic lands during precious time off from
work. Cruises provide all that the vacationer desires: accommodations,
meals, entertainment, and transportation.' In recent years, there has
been an increase in the number of people choosing to travel on cruise
ships.2 As the number of passengers increases,3 the number of injuries
or illnesses at sea has correspondingly increased.4 Injury or illness on a
cruise ship presents a unique situation: the ship is at sea and possibly far
from the nearest port where one could seek land-based medical services.
For many, an illness under these circumstances would only occur in a
nightmare, but for an unfortunate few, this situation is all too real. It
may be comforting to know that some cruise lines provide access to
medical professionals aboard their ships.5 For some, the presence of
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2005. The author wishes to thank all of those involved in the
writing process, from topic selection to finalizing the piece, and to express gratitude to friends and
loved ones for support along the way.
1. Carnival Cruise Lines' website advertises that its cruises provide the following types of
amenities: dining, both formal and casual; bars and nightclubs that provide "Vegas-style" shows;
spa treatment; and casinos, which include slot machines, blackjack poker and roulette. See
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., Onboard Experience, at http://www.carnival.com/CMS/Static-
Templates/onboardexp home.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
2. In the 1991 fiscal year, approximately 2.9 million passengers sailed on cruise ships from
the Port of Miami. Beth-Ann Erlic Herschaft, Comment, Cruise Ship Medical Malpractice Cases:
Must Admiralty Courts Steer by the Star of Stare Decisis?, 17 NOVA L. REv. 575, 576 n. 1 (1992).
In the 2003 fiscal year, nearly four million passengers sailed on one of the eighteen cruise ships
home ported at the Port of Miami. See Miami-Dade County, Port of Miami: Cruise Facts, at http:/
/www.miamidade.gov/portofmiami/cruise facts.asp (date last edited Apr. 2, 2004). "Cruise lines
carried eleven percent more passengers from U.S. ports in the first quarter of 2003 than they did in
the first quarter of 2002." Thomas A. Dickerson, The Cruise Passenger's Dilemma: Twenty-
First-Century Ships, Nineteenth-Century Rights, 28 TuL. MAR. L.J. 447, 453-54 (2004).
3. Cruise ships can now carry nearly 4000 passengers. See Dickerson, supra note 2, at 454.
4. See Thomas A. Gionis, Comment, Paradox on the High Seas: Evasive Standards of
Medical Care - Duty Without Standards of Care; A Call for the International Regulation of
Maritime Healthcare Aboard Ships, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 751, 764-65 (2001) (discussing an
increase in maritime injuries reported to the United States Coast Guard from the period of 1977
through 1986 to 1987 through 1997).
5. Carnival Cruise Line's website states: "Our infirmaries are staffed by qualified physicians
and nurses who are committed to providing the highest quality of shipboard medical care. Each
ship in the fleet carries one doctor and three nurses; the Destiny, Triumph and Victory each carry
two doctors and four nurses." Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., Customer Service, Frequently Asked
Questions, "Is there a Doctor on Board?", at http://www.camival.com/CMS/FAQs/Medical-
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medical care could be the deciding factor when choosing a cruise line
for vacation. 6 While the presence of medical care is a legitimate con-
cern, what may be more important is the nature of the law governing
shipboard medical care. It is the present status of this deeply-rooted
maritime law, which does not hold cruise lines liable for negligent medi-
cal care provided aboard their ships, that courts are struggling to fairly
reconcile with the reality facing today's cruise passenger.7
The United States Constitution specifically addresses maritime law.
"Article III of the Constitution extends the judicial power of federal
courts to 'all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.' "8 Congress
codified this constitutional grant of original jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333. The United States Supreme Court in Panama Railroad Co. v.
Johnson'° determined that the drafters placed maritime law "under
national control, because of its intimate relation to navigation and to
interstate and foreign commerce."" These procedural aspects of mari-
time law date back to the origin of the United States; substantive general
maritime law, however, reaches much further back in time.
General maritime law was spawned from "the well-known and the
well-developed 'venerable law of the sea,' which arose from the cus-
toms among 'seafaring men,' ... and which enjoyed 'international com-
ity.""' 2 For more than 3000 years nations have applied this body of
Services.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). Royal Caribbean International's website informs guests
"every Royal Caribbean ship offers limited professional medical services - for a reasonable fee -
through independently contracted, licensed (international or domestic) physicians and nurses."
Royal Caribbean International, All About Cruising, Accessibility Onboard, Feel Right at Home, at
http://www.royalcaribbean.com/allaboutcruising/accessibleseas/feelRightAtHome.do (last visited
Jan. 31, 2005). Norwegian Cruise Line provides guests with a physician and nurse onboard each
ship to provide medical care and services at customary charges. See Norwegian Cruise Line,
Important Passenger Info, What You Need to Know, Is there a Doctor on Board?, at http://www.
ncl.com/more/fp-mi_w2n.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
6. The existence of a doctor affected the Carlisle's (the family in the noted case) decision to
take the cruise. If Carnival Cruise Lines had not provided medical facilities onboard the vessel,
they would not likely have taken the cruise. Respondent's Answer Brief at 35, Carnival Corp. v.
Carlisle, 864 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (SC04-393).
7. If a passenger is injured on a cruise ship and decides to sue for her injuries, her case will
be decided under general maritime law. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959); Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir.
1989); Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. 741 F.2d 1332, 1334 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1004 (1985); Rindfleisch v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 498 So. 2d 488, 490 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied, 508 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1987).
8. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 960 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing U.S. CONST. art.
111, § 2, cl. 1).
9. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1948)).
10. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
11. Id. at 386.
12. Haver, 171 F.3d at 960 (citing United States v. W.M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179, 191
(1970); The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 363 (1885)).
HOPE FOR TEMPORARY CITIZENS
law. 13 This rich, ancient corpus of law served as the backdrop for the
framers when they drafted Article III of the Constitution. 4 This jus gen-
tium was not to constrain or bind federal courts, but was a point of
departure to be shaped and molded by federal courts exercising admi-
ralty jurisdiction. ' 5 In the interest of the application of uniform laws as
a vessel navigates the U.S. coastline through different states, the framers
permitted only Congress and the federal courts to create or alter general
maritime law.16
The general maritime law in the United States concerning ship-
board medical care shares these ancient roots. In 1887, the Court of
Appeals of New York in Laubheim v. Netherland Steamship Co. 7
denied the plaintiffs claim for imputation of the shipboard surgeon's
negligence to the shipping line. 8 The court held that the shipping line
"is responsible solely for its own negligence [in hiring the surgeon], and
not for that of the surgeon employed."' 19 This nineteenth-century case,
and subsequent cases interpreting its holding, shaped the general mari-
time law that currently governs the legal relationship between a cruise
line and its shipboard doctor.
This article addresses the distinct tension between the rapidly
evolving cruise industry and the slowly responding body of general mar-
itime law. This tension is exposed in the Florida Third District Court of
Appeal's decision of Carlisle v. Carnival Corp.,2  which analyzed the
current law governing the relationship between a cruise line and its ship-
board doctor. The noted case is significant because a state court
departed from the general maritime law, which has governed a ship-
owner's 2' liability for the acts of the ship's doctor for over one hundred
13. Id. (noting that "codifications of the maritime law have been preserved from ancient
Rhodes (900 B.C.E.), Rome (Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis) (533 C.E.), City of Trani (Italy)
(1063), England (The Law of Oleron) (1189), the Hanse Towns or Hanseatic League (1597), and
France (1681)").
14. See id.
15. See id.; see also Thompson v. The Catharina, 23 F. Cas. 1028, 1028-30 (D. Pa. 1795)
(No. 13,949) (tracing the development of general maritime law back to the laws of the Rhodians,
the Romans, the laws of Oleron, and the laws of the Hanse Towns).
16. See Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S 372, 381 (1918). See generally All
Underwriters v. Weisberg, 222 F.3d 1309 (11 th Cir. 2000); J.B. Efferson Co. v. Three Bays Corp.,
238 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1956); Northfield Ins. Co. v. Barlow, 983 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Fla. 1997);
Garan, Inc. v. M/V Aivik, 907 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Groff v. Chandris, Inc. 835 F. Supp.
1408 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
17. Laubheim v. Netherland S.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781 (N.Y. 1887).
18. Id. at 781.
19. Id.
20. Carlisle v. Carnival Corp., 864 So. 2d I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
21. For purposes of this article, the terms "shipowner" and "carrier" are used interchangeably
to refer to the party that is liable for torts committed on the vessel it owns or controls through
either direct ownership or a charter agreement.
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years. This article sets forth the facts of the noted case, surveys the legal
landscape regarding the particular legal issues, carefully analyzes the
court's holding, focusing on the legal steps the court utilized, details the
significance of the case, comments on the federal preemption issue not
addressed by the court, and finally concludes with the importance of the
decision and potential impact it may have in the future.
I. THE SCENARIO
In March of 1997, the Carlisle family, Kristopher, Darce, and their
fourteen-year-old daughter Elizabeth, embarked on a cruise with Carni-
val Cruise Lines (hereinafter "Carnival") aboard the M/S "Ecstasy."2
During the cruise, Elizabeth suffered from abdominal pain, lower back
pain, and diarrhea.2 As a result of her condition, Elizabeth visited the
ship's hospital several times, where she was seen by Dr. Mauro Neri.24
Over the course of several days, Dr. Neri repeatedly advised the Car-
lisles that their daughter was suffering from the flu.25 Responding to
their questions about appendicitis, he assured the Carlisle family that
Elizabeth suffered only from the flu and prescribed antibiotics.26 Out of
concern for Elizabeth, the Carlisles disembarked the ship and flew home
to Michigan where she was diagnosed as having a ruptured appendix.2"
Ultimately, the doctors determined that the ruptured appendix and subse-
quent infection rendered her sterile.28
As a result of Elizabeth's injuries and the events aboard the M/S
"Ecstasy," Darce Carlisle filed suit against Carnival and Dr. Neri in
Miami-Dade County Circuit Court. 9 The complaint alleged that Carni-
val was liable for Dr. Neri's negligence under the theories of agency and
apparent agency. 30 In addition, Carlisle alleged that Carnival acted neg-
ligently when it hired Dr. Neri.?
In the pre-trial stage of the litigation, Carnival moved for summary
judgment, claiming it was not liable for Dr. Neri's actions under the
theories of agency, apparent agency, or respondeat superior (vicarious
22. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 2.





28. Id. There is a dispute as to the precise nature of Elizabeth's injuries. See Petitioner's
Initial Brief at 4 n.3, Carlisle v. Carnival Corp., 864 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (SC04-
393).
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liability) based upon well-established principles of maritime law.32 The
trial court entered summary judgment for Carnival based upon those
principles.33
Carlisle appealed the trial court's decision to the Florida Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal. On appeal, the court reversed on the issue of vica-
rious liability and held:34 (1) the ship's doctor is an agent of Carnival
whose negligence should be imputed to the cruise line, regardless of the
doctor's ascribed contractual status; and (2) that the portion of the cruise
ticket in which the cruise line sought to disclaim liability for the negli-
gence of the ship's doctor was invalid. The appellate court remanded
the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.36 The
court also denied Carnival's subsequent motion for rehearing and certi-
fied that it had passed on a question of great public importance.37 The
case is currently active before the Florida Supreme Court. However, the
court has not rendered a decision as to certiorari.38
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The issue of whether a cruise line can be held vicariously liable for
the negligence of the ship's doctor based on agency or apparent agency
has never been squarely addressed by the Florida Third District Court of
Appeal, the Florida Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit, or the United States Supreme Court.39 Because of what the
court determined was a lack of binding authority, the Florida Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal surveyed the available precedents from other juris-
dictions, the rationales behind those cases, and the views of
commentators. The court then decided which rationale was most
persuasive.4 °
A. Standards Engraved in the Nineteenth Century
The Court of Appeals of New York was one of the first courts to
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The court found no error in the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment as to the
claim for negligent hiring. Id. at 8 n.5 (citing Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1373-
74 (5th Cir. 1988)).
35. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 7.
36. Id. at 8.
37. The court framed the issue as follows: "Whether a cruise line is vicariously liable for the
medical malpractice of the shipboard doctor, committed on a ship's passenger?" id.
38. See Online Docket, Case No. SC04-393, available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org
(last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
39. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 5. See Huntley v. Carnival Corp., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1374 n.5
(S.D. Fla. 2004) (stating the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed this issue).
40. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 5.
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address the negligence of a shipowner for its shipboard surgeon in the
case of Laubheim v. Netherland Steamship Co.4 In 1887, a passenger
on the steamship "Stella" slipped on the ship's deck injuring her knee
and, as a result, the shipboard surgeon operated on her injured knee.42
The passenger sued the shipping line, alleging it was liable for the negli-
gence of the shipboard surgeon.43 At trial, both parties presented expert
testimony regarding the treatment administered by the ship's surgeon,
and each expert rendered a different conclusion." The trial court dis-
missed the plaintiff s complaint because "no negligence upon the part of
the company in selecting the surgeon was shown."45 Consequently, the
plaintiff appealed. What the parties did not know was that the decision
by the Court of the Appeals of New York would affect passengers into
the twenty-first century. The court of last resort deemed it unnecessary
to determine "whether ... the steam-ship company owed a duty to its
passengers to provide a surgeon for their care and safety in the emer-
gency of sickness or accident ...."" The shipowner's duty to its pas-
sengers was to select a reasonably competent man for that office, and the
shipowner was only liable for neglect of that duty.47 This became the
only duty a shipowner owed to its passengers regarding medical care.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs recourse against the shipowner arising out of
the shipboard doctor's negligence was severely limited. Given a lack of
evidence that showed carelessness or neglect on the part of the shipping
line in its choice of surgeon, the court affirmed the trial court's
decision .
4 8
In O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co.,49 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts added flesh to the bones of the skeleton created by the
Court of Appeals of New York in Laubheim. In O'Brien, a passenger
sued a shipping line alleging the ship's surgeon was negligent when he
gave her a vaccination.5" The plaintiff based her action on the theory
that the surgeon was a "servant engaged in the ...business [of the
shipping line], and [was] subject to its control."'" The court began its
41. See Laubheim v. Netherland S.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781 (N.Y. 1887).





47. The court declared shipowners are "bound only to the exercise of reasonable care and
diligence, and [are] not compelled to select and employ the highest skill and longest experience."
Id.
48. Id. at 782.
49. O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 267.
[Vol. 59:295
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analysis by stating, "we are of opinion that the [shipping line] is not
liable for [the surgeon's] want of care in performing surgical opera-
tions. ' 2 The law at that time53 required a steamship or other vessel,
which carried more that fifty passengers, other than cabin passengers, to
carry a duly qualified surgeon to care for such passengers during the
voyage." Violations of the law subjected the master of the vessel to a
penalty not to exceed $250.55 Thus, shipping lines owed a legally
imposed duty to provide medical care for passengers who rode in steer-
age. The court interpreted this duty to require the carrier to employ a
duly qualified and competent medical practitioner .5  However, once the
shipowner provided a duly qualified medical practitioner, it was the pas-
senger's choice whether to employ his services; therefore, the practi-
tioner's work was under the control of the passenger, not the
shipowner.5 7 This finding ensured that the shipboard doctor was not a
servant of the shipowner.58 Justice Knowlton found, "[t]he law does not
put the business of treating sick passengers into the charge of common
carriers, and make them responsible for the proper management of it."
5 9
The court's decision was based on two factors: (1) the shipowner
lacked the expertise to meaningfully evaluate and, therefore, control a
doctor's treatment of his patients; and (2) even if it had the knowledge,
the shipowner lacked the power to intrude into the physician-patient
relationship.60 The court then stated:
[The passengers] may employ the ship's surgeon, or some other phy-
sician or surgeon who happens to be on board, or they may treat
themselves if they are sick, or may go without treatment if they pre-
fer; and, if they employ the surgeon, they may determine how far
they will submit themselves to his directions, and what of his
medicines they will take and what reject, and whether they will sub-
mit to a surgical operation or take the risk of going without it.
6
1
The court established the principles that shipboard medical services
were solely for the benefit of the passenger and the carrier remained
detached from the doctor-patient relationship. Thus, the shipping line
had fully discharged its duty to its passengers provided it had staffed a
52. Id. at 266-67.
53. Act of Aug. 2, 1882, ch. 374, 22 Stat. 186, 188 (1882) (regulating the carriage of
passengers by sea).







61. Id. (emphasis added).
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duly competent medical practitioner, supplied him with proper equip-
ment, and ensured he was prepared for the passengers if they wished to
employ his services.62 Ultimately, the court declared its view was fully
consistent with the Court of Appeals of New York in Laubheim.6 3
Essentially, O'Brien provided the detailed legal reasoning lacking in
Laubheim.
B. A Quick Detour
For over half a century, the Laubheim-O'Brien rationale served as
the marker for which courts chartered their courses when faced with
suits brought by passengers against shipowners seeking to recover for
the negligence of the shipboard doctor.' Then, in 1959, when faced
with a question similar to that as presented in Laubheim and O'Brien,
the District Court of the Northern District of California came to a differ-
ent conclusion. In Nietes v. American President Lines, Ltd.,6 5 the plain-
tiff, as administrator of his deceased son's estate, brought an action
against the vessel owner, shipboard physician, and nurses, alleging that
the negligent treatment of the ship's physician and nurses caused his
son's death.66 As a result of this alleged negligent treatment, the plain-
tiff claimed that the shipowner was liable under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior.6 7 The shipowner moved to dismiss, relying upon "the
ancient rule that a shipowner is liable for its negligence in hiring an
incompetent physician, but is not liable for negligent treatment by
him."68
Faced with the established general maritime law and a novel argu-
ment, Judge Sweigert held the ship's physician and nurses were servants
for the purposes of respondeat superior; therefore, it was possible that
the shipowner could be liable for their negligence.69 The court used a
four-part test to determine the physician's and nurses' status as servants:
(1) whether the ship's physician and nurses were in the regular
employment of the ship;
(2) whether they were salaried members of the crew;
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See generally The Korea Maru, 254 F. 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1918); The Great Northern, 251
F. 826, 830-32 (9th Cir. 1918); Branch v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 11 F. Supp. 832
(S.D.N.Y. 1935); Churchill v. United Fruit Co., 294 F. 400, 402 (D. Mass. 1923); The Napolitan
Prince, 134. F. 159, 160 (E.D.N.Y 1904).
65. Nietes v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 188 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
66. Id. at 220.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing The Korea Maru, 254 F. 397; The Great Northern, 251 F. 826; Laubheim v.
Netherland S.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781 (N.Y. 1887)).
69. Id.
[Vol. 59:295
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(3) whether they were subject to the ship's discipline and the
master's orders; and
(4) whether they were presumably under the general direction of
the company's chief surgeon through modern means of
communication.7 °
The court noted the existing shore side rule that a plaintiff could not
hold a non-professional employer liable for failure to exercise control or
supervision over a professionally skilled physician. 7' However, it
rejected this rule as outdated and stated it "no longer provide[d] a realis-
tic basis for the determination of liability in our modern, highly organ-
ized industrial society."'72 The court was persuaded to stray from the
existing rule, following a growing tendency in many land-based cases to
hold that a doctor was a servant in special circumstances, for example
where he was a resident physician on a hospital staff.73 In addition,
shipowners were held liable for negligence in navigation, even though
they had little or no skill in navigation. 4
Constructing a policy argument to provide additional support for its
position, the court found that if the carrier does not provide medical
services to discharge its duty of reasonable care to its passengers, it tra-
ditionally must divert the ship's course to the nearest port, depending on
the gravity of the illness.75 If the master of the vessel fails to take such
action when deemed necessary, the ill or injured passenger may sue the
shipowner for the negligent acts of the master under the theory of
respondeat superior.76 Thus, providing medical services has been the
traditional means in which a carrier has discharged its duty to its passen-
gers. The carrier thereby avoided the costly alternative of diverting the
entire vessel to provide medical attention to one passenger. A ship-
owner, when it provided medical care, benefited from having medical
professionals onboard by obtaining a competitive advantage over carri-
ers that did not.77 Ultimately, the court articulated the principle that if
the carrier intends to provide medical services to discharge its duty of
reasonable care to its passengers, it must do so carefully.78




74. Id. at 22 1.
75. Id. (citing The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240 (1904)).
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C. Back on Course
Despite the Nietes decision, the Laubheim-O'Brien rationale was
embedded in maritime jurisprudence regarding a carrier's liability for
the negligence of the medical professionals that it provided for its pas-
sengers. In the landmark case, Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star,7 9 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit continued to apply
the general maritime law established in Laubheim-O'Brien, thereby
refusing to set sail on the course chartered by Nietes. In Barbetta, the
appellate court confronted the question of whether a carrier that pro-
vided a doctor for its passengers was liable for the negligence of that
doctor.
The Barbettas sued the S/S "Bermuda Star" (hereinafter "Star"), the
vessel owner, and the company that chartered the vessel, Bahama
Cruise.80 The plaintiffs were passengers onboard the Star on a cruise
organized by Bahama Cruise, which sailed from New Orleans, Louisi-
ana to Key West, Florida, and then on to Cozumel and Playa del Car-
men, Mexico.8" During the five-day period on the vessel, Mrs. Barbetta
developed a serious case of pneumonia and lapsed into a coma. Eventu-
ally, she was removed from the ship and taken to a hospital for
treatment.
82
The Barbettas alleged the shipboard doctor's failure to care for
Mrs. Barbetta caused her severe case of pneumonia and eventual
coma.83 They claimed when she initially sought treatment from the
ship's doctor she was suffering from diabetes, a condition of which she
was unaware, and which the doctor failed to diagnose.84 The Barbettas
argued that since the doctor was in the course and scope of his employ-
ment, Bahama Cruise was vicariously liable for the doctor's negligence
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.85
The cruise line's main defense was that under general maritime
principles it was not liable for the negligence of the ship's doctor.86 It
also argued that the ticket served as a binding contract between the
cruise line and the passenger.87 The pertinent part of the ticket read:
79. Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1988).
80. Id. at 1365.




85. Id. The Barbettas also alleged that the cruise line negligently hired the doctor. The court
found no genuine issue of material fact regarding that claim of negligent hiring and granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
86. Id.
87. See The Moses Taylor, 7 U.S. 411, 427 (1866); Wallis v. Princess Cruise, Inc. 306 F.3d
827, 834 (9th Cir. 2002).
[Vol. 59:295
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[Any physician provided by the Carrier is] solely for the convenience
of the Passenger and services rendered by [the physician] to the Pas-
senger are at the latter's expense. Any such person in dealing with,
giving service to, treating or operating upon a Passenger is not the
servant or agent of the Carrier, and the Carrier shall not be liable for
any omission, negligence or damage done by such person.
88
The cruise line argued that the doctor provided was for the convenience
of the passenger, and that the doctor was not an agent; therefore, the
cruise line was not liable for negligence imputed to the doctor.8 9
The cruise line moved for summary judgment based upon this argu-
ment. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Loui-
siana granted the motion.90 The district court began its decision from a
unique point of departure by recognizing that the cruise line intended to
limit its liability as evidenced by the disclaimer in the passenger ticket. 91
Further, the cruise line intended to limit liability regardless of whether
the doctor was an independent contractor or an employee. 92 This led the
court to narrow the issue to whether the defendant's limitation of liabil-
ity was against public policy. 93 It reasoned that "because of the unusual
nature of the voyage, because of the unusual nature of admiralty, and
because it [is] in the best interest of the passengers... aboard vessels," a
vessel ought to be able to contract away liability with its passengers. 94
The court concluded that vessel owners were more willing to provide
medical care if the ship's doctors only contracted with, and were liable
to, the passengers. 95 Thus, the cruise line was not held liable based upon
the theory of respondeat superior.96 The Barbettas subsequently
appealed the decision.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis from a differ-
ent point of departure. It asked the question, "[d]oes general maritime
law impose liability, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, upon a
carrier or ship owner for the negligence of a ship's doctor who treats the
ship's passengers?" 97 Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Fifth Cir-
cuit had previously ruled on the issue. 98 However, "an impressive num-
ber . . . [had], for almost one hundred years, followed the same basic
88. Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1366 (emphasis added).
89. Id.







97. Id. at 1369.
98. Id.
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rule."9 9 The court referenced the principles established in Laubheim-
O'Brien, framing the rule as:
When a carrier undertakes to employ a doctor aboard ship for its pas-
sengers' convenience, the carrier has a duty to employ a doctor who
is competent and duly qualified. If the carrier breaches its duty, it is
responsible for its own negligence [in hiring the doctor]. If the doctor
is negligent in treating a passenger, however, that negligence will not
be imputed to the carrier. l00
Next, it looked to the two factors enunciated in Laubheim-O'Brien.
First, the carrier was not in the business of practicing medicine. Second,
the carrier did not interfere with the doctor-patient relationship. °0 The
court then cited Amdur v. Zim Israel Navigation Co."°2 for the oft-
quoted proposition that "[a] ship is not a floating hospital; [thus,] a
ship's physician is an independent medical expert engaged on the basis
of his professional qualifications."'' 0 3 This provided the logical step the
court needed to claim the carrier did not, and could not, have sufficient
control over the medical treatment provided by the ship's doctor."°4
Because the carrier did not have sufficient control over the ship's
doctor, the shipowner was not a master; thus, control, an essential ele-
ment of respondeat superior, was not satisfied. 0 5 The carrier lacked
"the ability to meaningfully control the relevant actions of its 'servant' -
that is, the ship's doctor."'0 6 Therefore, the cruise line was not vicari-
ously liable for the doctor's negligence.' 07 Before the court ended its
opinion, it reviewed and analyzed the plaintiffs position, which argued
for a departure from Laubheim-O'Brien and an adoption of Nietes.'°8
The Fifth Circuit criticized Nietes and stated the reasoning was
"internally contradictory," and the decision "unrealistically presumed
away the problem."'0 9 The court asserted that Nietes "claimed that the
carrier's ability to control the doctor should not be considered . . . ;
instead .... a carrier must be liable for a ship doctor's negligent treat-
ment because the carrier chose to discharge its duty to provide its pas-
sengers with reasonable medical care by bringing the doctor aboard the
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 276 (Mass. 1891)).
102. Amdur v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 310 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y 1981).
103. Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1370 (quoting Amdur, 310 F. Supp. at 1042).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1369.
106. Id. at 1370.
107. Id. at 1369.
108. Id. at 1370.
109. Id.
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ship.""'  The court averred that the Nietes rationale sounded in strict
liability." ' I However, the Nietes court recognized the necessity of con-
trol by only imposing liability when the carrier has some control over
the doctor, i.e., the carrier pays the doctor's salary, can subject him to
discipline, and can give him orders." 2 Consequently, the Nietes court
determined "that the employment relationship between a carrier and a
ship's doctor provid[ed] the necessary control.""' 3 The Barbetta court
disagreed with the Nietes court's interpretation of the requisites of con-
trol under the theory of respondeat superior. "'
Again, the court returned to the two factors set out in O'Brien. It
quoted Amdur, which also disagreed with the notion that there is suffi-
cient control established through a link with the chief surgeon through
the modem means of communication. 5 The Barbetta court drew a dis-
tinction between the employer's right to control its employee's general
actions and the employer's ability to control its employee's specific
actions, maintaining the carrier lacks the ability to control the doctor's
specific actions.
Furthermore, the court disagreed with the Nietes position that a car-
rier escaped its duty to render ordinary prudent care to its passengers by
hiring a ship's doctor, because the carrier also had a duty to hire a doctor
that is duly competent and qualified. The Barbetta court reasoned that
the cruise line could face liability for the negligent hiring of the doctor it
provided, and this potential liability adequately discharged its duty." 6
In addition, it maintained that a passenger could have rejected the ship-
board doctor's care and the cruise line would then have to satisfy its
duty in some other way. 1 7 Thus, the court concluded that respondeat
superior liability was unnecessary to enforce the cruise line's duty of
care toward its passenger. 1 8
D. A Potential Remedy While Maintaining Uniformity
The Barbetta opinion represented the general maritime rule regard-
ing liability predicated upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Although the Nietes court offered a different approach to respondeat




113. Id. at 1371.
114. See id. at 1372.
115. Id. at 1371 (quoting Amdur, 310 F. Supp. at 1042).
116. Id. at 1373.
117. Id. at 1372.
118. Id.
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these cases as a backdrop, the Southern District of Florida, situated in a
major hub of the cruise industry, discovered additional complexities sur-
rounding the question of a cruise line's liability for its onboard doctor.
In 1993, a federal trial court in Florida carefully parsed the Barbetta
rationale and recognized that, while it foreclosed liability based on
respondeat superior, a plaintiff could possibly recover under the theory
of apparent agency without disturbing the Barbetta rule. Unfortunately,
the procedural posture of the case prevented the court from delving into
the merits. Two years later, another federal trial court in Florida
addressed the merits of an apparent agency argument, but the facts of the
case did not support liability. These two cases added to the legal land-
scape concerning the issue of a shipowner's liability for the negligent
medical care provided by its doctor. 19
The United States District Court of the Southern District of Florida
addressed the issue of whether a cruise line was liable for the malprac-
tice of the shipboard doctor in Fairley v. Royal Cruise Line Ltd. 2 o In
Fairley, the plaintiff sued Royal Cruise Line (hereinafter "Royal") for
negligence and negligent hiring, among other theories, arising out of the
plaintiff's injury and subsequent treatment by the shipboard doctor,
which occurred while aboard one of Royal's cruise ships.' 2 ' More spe-
cifically, Count III of the plaintiffs amended complaint alleged that
"Royal Cruise Lines [was] liable for the alleged malpractice of its ship
doctor alternatively on theories of apparent agency (also called agency-
by-estoppel), joint venture, and respondeat superior (vicarious liabil-
ity)."' 22 Royal moved to dismiss the complaint and asserted that "[i]t is
well[-]established under general maritime law that the only cause of
action that may accrue against a shipowner for injuries resulting from
the alleged malpractice of the ship's doctor is a claim for negligent
hiring."' 23
Then U.S. District Judge Stanley Marcus' 24 denied Royal's motion
119. At the time Carlisle was decided, the Southern District had handed down other decisions
that addressed the issue of a shipowner's liability for the shipboard doctor's medical malpractice.
However, none of those opinions, besides Warren v. Ajax Navigation Corp. of Monrovia and
Fairley v. Royal Cruise Line, explicitly discussed or ruled on liability under the theory of apparent
agency. See Jackson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1373-74 (S.D. Fla. 2002);
Doe v. Celebrity Cruise Lines, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Warren v. Ajax
Navigation Corp. of Monrovia, 1995 A.M.C. 2609 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Fairley v. Royal Cruise Line,
1993 A.M.C. 1633 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Nanz v. Costa Cruises, Inc., 1999 A.M.C. 48, 50 (S.D. Fla.
1991); Mascolo v. Costa Crociere, 726 F. Supp. 1285, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
120. Fairley v. Royal Cruise Line, 1993 A.M.C. 1633 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1634.
123. Id.
124. The Honorable Stanley Marcus was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
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to dismiss.'25 The court noted the position taken by the defendants, 2 6
but it did not stop its analysis at that point. The court proceeded to
discuss vicarious liability1 2
7 under the theory of respondeat superior.
28
Judge Marcus went further and analyzed the case law and alternative
views expressed by Martin J. Norris, 129 a well-known commentator on
maritime personal injury law.' 3° First, the court outlined the position
articulated in Barbetta as follows: (1) the shipowner lacks the ability to
meaningfully control the shipboard doctor; and (2) it is the patient, not
Eleventh Circuit on November 12, 1997. About the Court, Circuit Judges, at http://www.cal 1.
uscourts.gov/about/judges.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
125. Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1633.
126. The court stated, "[i]ndeed, the overwhelming tide of case law on the question holds that a
shipowner may not be held vicariously liable for the torts of the ship's doctor." Id. at 1634
(citations omitted).
127. Id. at 1635. The theory of vicarious liability of a principal for the acts of its agent turns
primarily on the ability of the principal to control the acts of the agent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 220(1), cmt. d (1958). Since vicarious liability is based on control, the principal is
protected from liability for the acts of a truly independent contractor. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS § 409, cmt. b (1965) (emphasis added). The determination of whether a shipboard doctor
is a servant or an independent contractor is a legal conclusion. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220(2). The court referenced the following factors for the analysis of servant or
independent contractor status, none of which is alone dispositive:
whether the work is "part of the regular business of the employer"; whether the
contractor is engaged in a distinct calling; the degree of skill of the contractor; who
supplies the locale, tools and instrumentalities; the period of employment and the
method of payment; and the extent of control exercised by the principal over the
contractor or provided for by the agreement between them.
Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1635 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)).
128. "Respondeat superior is conceptually different from liability for negligent hiring: under
respondeat superior, the negligent acts of even the highly qualified agent may still engender the
vicarious liability of the employer." Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1636 (citing Sambula v. Cent. Gulf
S.S. Co., 268 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D. Tex. 1967)).
129. Martin J. Norris (1908-1999) received his law degree from Brooklyn Law School in 1930.
He worked in government in Washington and New York from 1936 to 1956. He then served as an
United States Coast Guard Administrative Law Judge from 1956 to 1970. He authored several
widely cited books on maritime law, including the two-volume work, Ti-E LAW OF MARITIME
PERSONAL INJURIES and the three-volume work, THE LAW OF SEAMEN. Eric Pace, Martin J.
Norris, 91, Judge and Authority on Maritime Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at C23.
130. Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1635 n.2. The court cited the following portion of Mr. Norris's
text:
It is submitted that the ship's doctor is not an independent contractor, but, in fact, a
paid employee of the shipowner. He is a staff officer aboard ship; and signs the
articles as a member of the ship's company. He is a subject to ship's discipline
under the general maritime law and is subject to the lawful commands of the master.
When sick or injured he is entitled to remedies of maintenance and cure, the Jones
Act, and of a seaworthy ship. Like the steward or radio operator, the ship's doctor
is a seaman for the purposes of the personal injury remedies and for wage relief.
The professional standing of a physician is not a valid argument for affording him a
special status when a member of the ship's company. He must, in truth, be regarded
as on par with his fellow officers.
Id. (quoting I MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 3:10, at 75 (4th
ed. 1990)).
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the shipowner, who actually controls the physician. 13' The court
asserted, "[t]he consequence of the rule is that regardless of whether the
ship's doctor is an independent contractor or in the regular employ of the
ship, any claim against the carrier for the malpractice of its doctor must
be dismissed."'132 Further:
the harshness of the rule can only be justified by the notion that
meaningful control is a prerequisite to vicarious liability and that -
under any conceivable set of facts, and even if [the ship's doctor] is a
regular crew-member - the carrier has no meaningful ability to con-
trol the ship's doctor. 1
33
Next, the court presented the Nietes rationale as follows: if (1) the
shipboard doctor was "in the regular employment of the ship"; (2) "as a
salaried member of the crew"; (3) "subject to the ship's discipline and
the master's orders"; and (4) "presumably also under the general direc-
tion and supervision of the [shipowner's] chief surgeon through modern
means of communication," the doctor was an agent under sufficient con-
trol for purposes of respondeat superior.
134
Courts that have analyzed Nietes under a Barbetta-like rationale
have criticized the opinion and claimed a shore side chief surgeon does
not provide the control necessary for vicarious liability under the theory
of respondeat superior.35 The Fairley court also proposed that
medicine is inherently a more skillful profession, which for purposes of
vicarious liability may render a doctor's relationship with his employer
"a breed apart from the less technical master-servant relationships."1 36
In some situations, however, courts have held employers vicariously lia-
ble under the theory of respondeat superior even with distinct profes-
sions and contract provisions, suggesting the contrary.
137
In addition, there might be a meaningful difference in the relation-
ship between a cruise line and a ship's doctor, and a hospital and a staff
physician with respect to the amount of supervision and control.1 38
131. Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1636.
132. Id. at 1636-37.
133. Id. at 1637.
134. Id. (quoting Nietes v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 188 F. Supp. 219, 220 (N.D. Cal. 1959)).
135. Id. (citing Amdur v. Zim Israel Navigation Co, 310 F. Supp. 1033, 1042-43 (S.D.N.Y
1981); Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1371 (5th Cir. 1988); Di Bonaventure v.
Home Lines, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 100, 103 (E.D. Pa. 1982)).
136. See Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1638.
137. Id. at 1635-36 (citing Pearl v. West End St. Ry. Co., 57 N.E. 339, 339 (1900) (Holmes, J.)
(noting that "there is no more distinct calling than that of the doctor"); Bing v. Thunig, 163 N.Y.S
2d. 3 (1957) (adopting the rule of respondeat superior and abandoning the doctrine of immunity
of hospitals for the negligent acts of its employees based on the theory that the patient controlled
the administration of care); 5 F.V. Harper, F. James, Jr., & O.S. Gray, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.11
(2d ed. 1986)).
138. Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1638.
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Moving beyond the analysis of the shipowner's ability to control the
actions of the shipboard doctor, the court found something that Barbetta
had not. It found a different type of control illustrated in the following:
Granted, the cruise ship is not a "floating hospital." It is more like a
"floating hotel." But the passengers on a floating hotel are in a radi-
cally different situation from the guests in a hotel ashore: they are a
captive audience. Contrary to the reasoning of Amdur and Barbetta,
[the passengers] are not "free to contract with [the ship's doctor] for
any medical services they may require." If a passenger is ill, and port
is distant, the ship's doctor is the passenger's only resort, since evac-
uation by air rescue is expensive, possible and appropriate only for
emergencies. Further, the passengers may be reluctant to seek treat-
ment from an unknown doctor in a foreign country.
1 39
Statutory or common law maritime law does not require shipowners to
provide shipboard doctors. 4 ° However, if shipowners do not, they must
discharge their duty to provide reasonable medical attention in some
other way, which could lead to a much greater expense.' 4 ' The court
concluded that where a cruise line has reaped the benefits of having a
doctor, "there may be circumstances where it should be required to bear
its consequences."' 42
The court then noted that the Barbetta line of cases rejects recovery
based on the theory of respondeat superior. However, the plaintiff in
the case before the court alleged several other theories of liability. 1
4 3
The court asserted, "we cannot say that there is no conceivable set of
facts under which the Plaintiff could prevail on her claim in Count III
on, for example, an [apparent agency theory].""' Even if the doctor
139. Id. at 1638-39 (citing Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1370; Amdur, 310 F. Supp. at 1042; Michael
J. Compagno, Note, Malpractice on the Love Boat: Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 14 TUL. MAR.
L. J. 381, 389 (1990) (emphasis added)).
140. Id. at 1639.
141. The court noted that evacuation by air rescue is very expensive, and diverting the vessel is
a great inconvenience. Id.
142. Id. (citing Guido Calibresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L. J. 499 (1961)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1639. The Restatement (Second) of Agency describes the agency-by-estoppel
theory as follows:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a
third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such an apparent agent is
subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of
the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.
Id. at 1640 n.6 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958)). In addition, the
illustration is insightful:
P, a department store, contracts with T, as an independent contractor, to give
medical attention to patrons of the store, T appearing as an employee . . . [B]y
mistake T gives poison to a patron of the store, who takes it in the belief that it is
medicine. P is liable for the harm.
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was an independent contractor, if the shipowner held the doctor out to be
an agent, suggesting the doctor was treating the plaintiff on behalf of the
carrier and the plaintiff so relied to her detriment, then the carrier could
be liable for the shipboard doctor's negligence under the theory of
apparent agency.
14 5
The court averred the carrier cannot circumvent liability under the
theory of apparent agency by inserting in its passenger ticket a provision
which claims that the ship's doctor is not an agent and it is not liable for
his actions. It referred to 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c(a), 14 6 which prevents
owners of passenger vessels from disclaiming liability in the event of
death or personal injury due to the negligence or fault of said owners or
his agents or servants. 
147
Since the court was reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted,'48 it did not defini-
tively rule on the merits of the claim against the cruise line for the negli-
gence of its doctor under one of the theories of liability. However, it did
state that it would not be impossible for the plaintiff to prevail. 4 9
Therefore, the court denied the defendants motion to dismiss as to Count
III of the plaintiff's complaint, the count containing apparent agency.1
50
Given the Fairley court did not dismiss the plaintiffs complaint,
this decision falls somewhere between Nietes and Barbetta. It did not
whole-heartedly accept the Nietes rationale; instead, it identified a the-
ory of recovery that would not disrupt maritime law. It is important to
note that the procedural posture of the case did not allow the court to
hear the merits of the claim. Consequently, it is impossible to determine
exactly how it would have decided the case on the merits. Given the
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 illus. 3-4 (1958)).
145. Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1640.
146. The relevant portion of 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c(a) is reproduced as follows:
It shall be unlawful for the manager, agent, master, or owner, of any vessel
transporting passengers between ports of the United States or between any such port
and a foreign port to insert in any rule, regulation, contract, or agreement any
provision or limitation (1) purporting, in the event of loss of life or bodily injury
arising from the negligence or fault of such owner or his servants, to relieve such
owner, master, or agent from liability, or from liability beyond any stipulated
amount, for such loss or injury ... All such provisions or limitations contained in
any such rule, regulation, contract, or agreement are declared to be against public
policy and shall be null and void and of no effect.
46 U.S.C. app. § 183c(a) (2000).
147. Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1641 n.7.
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
149. Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1641.
150. Id. Count III also sought recovery based on respondeat superior, but the court foreclosed
recovery under that theory when it stated, "[a]lthough the majority rule preclude[d] suing the
shipowner based on the theory of respondeat superior, [the] [pilaintiff has suggested several other
theories." Id. at 1640.
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attention the court devoted in its opinion to discussing possible claims
upon which the plaintiff could have a basis for recovery, it is reasonable
to say the Fairley court leaned more toward Nietes' policy rather than
Barbetta's. Ultimately, Fairley did not depart from well-established
principles of general maritime law.
Two years later, in Warren v. Ajax Navigation Corp. of Monro-
via,'5 1 the issue surfaced again in the Southern District of Florida. In
Warren, the plaintiff, who suffered a heart attack while on a cruise, sued
the cruise line for negligent medical care, alleging breach of contract and
negligence under the theory of apparent agency. 52 The plaintiff argued
that the statements made in the ship's brochure created a binding con-
tract under which the shipowner was required to provide him with medi-
cal care. 153 First, the court granted summary judgment as to the breach
of contract claim, finding "no provisions contained in the defendant's
marketing brochure may be incorporated into the Contract of Pas-
sage."' 54 Next, the court analyzed the claim for liability based on appar-
ent agency.
The court began by analyzing whether the plaintiff reasonably
believed that an agency relationship existed. It looked to case law on the
issue for guidance. Interestingly, the court did not consider Nietes or
Fairley.'55 Instead, the court adopted the position articulated in
Barbetta, and relied upon the two factors set forth in O'Brien, that "the
carrier or shipowner lack[ed] both (1) the expertise to meaningfully
evaluate and, therefore, control a doctor's treatment of his patients and
(2) the power, even if it had the knowledge, to intrude into the physi-
cian-patient relationship." '56  Under the well-established rule in
Barbetta, the court dismissed the plaintiffs claim that he reasonably
believed the ship's doctor was an agent of the carrier.' 57 It commented
that though the plaintiff's claim might have been honest, it was unrea-
sonable given the clear rule of law." 8 In footnote three of the opinion,
the court quoted the time-tested notion that "[i]gnorance of the law is no
defense," and stated that this proposition "[a]pplies in the present case
.... "1'9 The court then considered whether the plaintiff relied upon his
151. Warren v. Ajax Navigation Corp. of Monrovia, 1995 A.M.C. 2609 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2610.
154. Id. at 2611.
155. This is an observation from the opinion. The litigants may not have addressed Nietes or
Fairley in their briefs.
156. Warren, 1995 A.M.C. at 2612 (citing Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1371
(5th Cir. 1988)).
157. Id. at 2613.
158. Id. at 2612-13.
159. Id. at 2613 n.3.
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"unreasonable" belief that the ship's doctor was an agent of the ship-
owner when purchasing his cruise ticket.
The plaintiff stated in his deposition that he had cruised on that
particular line on five previous occasions and his only criteria when
selecting a cruise was cost and availability. 6 ' The status of the ship's
doctor was not a consideration. 6 ' The court determined that the plain-
tiff failed to show that his decision to take the cruise was in reliance on
the shipboard doctor's status as an agent of the shipowner.' 62 Judge
Ryskamp granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
claims based on the theory of apparent agency.
III. THE DECISION
With the above referenced case law as its background, the Florida
Third District Court of Appeal decided to reject application of the gen-
eral maritime law in Carlisle, and travel into the waters explored by
Nietes.'6 3 The court began its analysis by establishing the relationship
between Carnival and Dr. Neri, quoting the pertinent parts of Dr. Neri's
contract with Carnival. Paraphrased, the contract provided:
(1) Dr. Neri shall treat both the passengers and crew;
(2) the treatment Dr. Neri renders shall be in accordance with
Carnival's Physician guidelines;
(3) the treatment shall be performed on a seven-day per week
basis during regular and on-call hours and for emergencies;
(4) Dr. Neri's sole source of income is a weekly salary provided
by Carnival during the term of his employment;
(5) Carnival could dismiss Dr. Neri for "violations of the Ship's
160. Id. at 2613.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. The Barbetta rule is well-settled maritime law; before Carlisle, only Nietes had departed
from this precedent. See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F. 2d 1364, 1369 (5th Cir. 1988)
(citing ten cases in support of its position); Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A, 895 F.2d 107, 108 (2d
Cir. 1990) (refusing to overturn the well-established maritime precedent that a ship doctor's
negligence in treating passengers not be imputed to the shipowner or operator); Jackson v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, 203 F. Supp, 2d 1367, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Doe v. Celebrity Cruise
Lines, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345-46 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Warren, 1995 A.M.C. at 2612 (declaring
that "[ilt is well settled under general maritime law" that a shipowner is not vicariously liable for
the negligence of the shipboard doctor); Fairley v. Royal Cruise Line, 1993 A.M.C. 1633, 1634
(S.D. Fla. 1993) (stating that "the overwhelming tide of case law on the question holds that a
shipowner may not be held vicariously liable for the torts of the ship's doctor"); Nanz v. Costa
Cruise, Inc., 1991 A.M.C. 48, 49-50 (S.D. Ha. 1990) (finding that each court with the exception
of Nietes followed the same rule when addressing the issue of whether a shipowner was
vicariously liable for the shipboard doctor's negligence); Mascolo v. Costa Crociere, 726 F. Supp.
1285, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (noting the long established rule in admiralty that a shipowner is not
vicariously liable for the negligence of the shipboard doctor).
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Articles" or "failure to perform his duties to the satisfaction of
Carnival";
(6) Carnival issued Dr. Neri a ship's uniform;
(7) Dr. Neri agreed to have his photograph taken and his name
and likeness could be used to promote and publicize Carni-
val's vessel in any and all media;
(8) Carnival considered Dr. Nefi to be an officer of the ship;
(9) in a separate agreement, Carnival agreed to indemnify Dr.
Nefi for up to $1 million dollars for claims brought against
him while acting in the course of the ship's duties;
(10) Dr. Nefi agreed to permit Carnival, or its insurer, to take abso-
lute control over defense and handling of claims brought
against him.164
Another relevant factor was that Carnival charged and collected the fee
for medical care rendered on the ship. 16 5 These facts served as grounds
for determining that Dr. Nefi was subject to control and an agent of
Carnival.
Next, the court laid out the relevant portion of the Carlisle's cruise
ticket that explained the disclaimer of liability for acts or omissions of
the ship's physician.' 66 A passenger ticket is a maritime contract gov-
erned by maritime law. 16 7 Thus, the passenger ticket established a con-
tractual relationship between Carnival and the Carlisles. The disclaimer
of liability found in the cruise ticket was similar to ones found in
Barbetta, Warren, and Fairley.
The court then established admiralty jurisdiction.' 68 It then
declared that a cruise line ticket is a maritime contract governed by mar-
itime law,16 9 and lastly stated that a carrier owes a duty of reasonable
164. Carlisle v. Carnival Corp., 864 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
165. Passengers pay for medical services using their "Sail and Sign Card," which is a form of a
credit card passengers are issued when they arrive onboard. Respondent's Answer Brief at 3,
Carnival Corp. v. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (SC04-393). Passengers then
either pay cash or charge to a normal credit card the charges made on the "Sail and Sign Card."
166. The following portion of the passenger ticket was reproduced in the opinion:
If the vessel carries a physician, nurse, masseuse, barber, hair dresser or manicurist,
it is done solely for the convenience of the guest and any such person in dealing
with the guest is not and shall not be considered in any respect whatsoever, as the
employee, servant or agent of the carrier and the carrier shall not be liable for any
act or omission of such person or those under his order or assisting him with respect
to treatment, advice or care of any kind given to any guest.
Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 2-3.
167. See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. 411, 427 (1866).
168. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 3 (citing Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358
U.S. 625 (1959); Klosters Rederi v. Cowden, 447 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Rand v.
Hatch, 762 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
169. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. at 427; Wallis v. Princess Cruise Lines, Inc., 306 F.3d 827,
834 (9th Cir. 2002).
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care to its passenger under maritime law."'
The court outlined the arguments made by both Carnival and Car-
lisle. Carnival argued that the cruise line's duty to its passengers does
not impose vicarious liability upon the cruise line for the shipboard phy-
sician's alleged negligent treatment of one of its passengers. Carnival
cited to Barbetta, the cases Barbetta cited, and the cases that subse-
quently cited the seminal decision.17 1 Conversely, Carlisle argued that
the Barbetta cases are "based upon flawed and outmoded assumptions
regarding the cruise ship industry and the provision of medical services
to passengers," and urged the court to adopt the position presented in
Nietes. 1
72
With the parties' positions framed, the court foreshadowed its hold-
ing by citing to Nietes and Fairley. 173 The court stated that the Fairley
court "criticiz[ed] Barbetta and support[ed] the rationale of Nietes, while
recognizing the viability of an apparent agency theory of recovery."' 74
The court began its analysis by stating that the issue had not been
addressed by the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme
Court.' 75 Given the lack of what the court perceived as binding prece-
dent, it found "Nietes to be the most persuasive precedent."' 76 The court
also quoted the following passage from Norris's fourth edition of The
Law of Maritime Personal Injury:
In light of the modern trends with respect to tort liability, it is proba-
ble that the earlier cases holding that in passenger matters the ship-
owner's duty is fulfilled by employing a duly qualified and
competent surgeon and medical practitioner and is only liable for
negligence in hiring him but not for treatment by him, will not be
170. Kennarec, 358 U.S. at 62; Rindfleisch v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 498 So. 2d 488 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
171. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 3 (citing Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1369 (5th
Cir. 1988), The Korea Maru, 254 F. 399 (9th Cir. 1918); The Great Northern, 251 F. 826, 830-32
(9th Cir. 1918); Di Bonaventure v. Home Lines, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 100, 103-04 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Cimini v. Italia Crociere Int'l S.P.A., 1981 A.M.C. 2674, 2677 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Amdur v. Zim
Israel Navigation Co., 310 F. Supp. 1033, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Branch v. Compagnie Generalc
Transatlantique, 11 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Churchill v. United Fruit Co., 294 F. 400, 402
(D. Mass. 1932); The Napolitan Prince, 134 F. 159, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1904); O'Brien v. Cunard, 28
N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891); Laubheim v. Netherland S.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781 (N.Y. 1887). See also
Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 895 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1990); Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, 145 F.
Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Mascolo v. Costa Crociere, 726 F. Supp. 1285 (S.D. Fla. 1989)).
172. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 1.
173. Id. at 4.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 5.
176. Id. (citing NORRIS, supra note 130, at 75; Herschaft, supra note 2; Compagno, supra note
139).
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followed .. .
The court then commented on the Barbetta rationale. It criticized
Barbetta and the subsequent line of cases, stating they rest on an
"unrealistic suggestion" that an ill or injured cruise passenger, at sea, has
some meaningful choice of whether to forego treatment by the ship's
doctor.' 78 The court described the reality regarding the degree of pas-
senger choice, with respect to medical care, when it asserted, "[a] cruise
passenger at sea and in medical distress does not have any meaningful
choice but to seek treatment from the ship's doctor."'
' 79
The court noted that the underlying theory in the Barbetta line of
cases stems from the two factors set out in O'Brien: (1) the shipowner's
lack of control and (2) that the shipowner cannot interfere in the doctor-
patient relationship. In addition, the court highlighted the passage in
O'Brien where the court stated, "or may go without treatment if they
prefer .... "180 The court noted that absent from the list of options that
O'Brien offered passengers was the "in some other way" option offered
by Barbetta. 181 It emphasized this point, and explained that this "con-
cept was no more realistic in 1891 than it is today"; Barbetta only
inserted the "in some other way" language to "ameliorate the harshness
of the rule it espoused."' 
82
The court systematically picked apart the underlying presumptions
upon which the Barbetta cases rested their decisions. The court charac-
terized as a "fallacy" the notion of a choice as put forth in O'Brien and
Barbetta and called the theory that a ship's doctor is on the ship for the
passenger's convenience a "fiction." '83 The Barbetta line of cases
assumes, the court reasoned, that an ill passenger, far away from a hos-
pital, would go through a series of available choices and, after prudent
consideration, ultimately choose to seek the services of the ship's
177. Id. (quoting NORRIS, supra note 130, at 74). Norris, the Carlisle court pointed out,
referenced the "excellent opinion" in Nietes following the above-quoted passage. Id.
178. Id. at 6. The Barbetta line of cases presumes that a passenger can simply decide not to
forgo treatment by the ship's physician and demand that the ship's captain fulfill his or her duty
through some other means. However, even if the passenger demands to be airlifted to a location
on land to receive medical attention, this request may not always be granted. See Pota v. Holtz,
852 So. 2d 379, 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (cruise line denied pregnant passenger's request to
be airlifted to the nearest hospital).
179. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 5 (emphasis added).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 5. The full passage the court quotes from O'Brien is as follows, "tlhey may
employ the ship's surgeon, or some other physician or surgeon who happens to be on board, or
they may treat themselves if they are sick, or may go without treatment if they prefer ......
O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 276 (Mass. 1891).
182. Id. (footnote omitted).
183. Id. at 6.
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doctor. 84
The court believed that having a doctor onboard served the cruise
line's interests.' 85 It allowed the cruise line "to fulfill its duty to ill or
injured passengers without necessarily being required to disrupt the voy-
age or incur the great expense to evacuate the patient."' 86 The court
recognized that the "practical realities of the competitive cruise line
industry" dictated that a ship carry a doctor even though not required by
law to do so. 187 It characterized a cruise ship as a small city at sea for
days at a time. 188 The average cruise ship holds over 2000 passengers
89
plus the crew. 19° Sailing this small city at sea for several days leads to
the reasonably anticipated risk that some passengers will become ill or
be injured. 19' Not only does the cruise line reduce its costs by providing
a doctor, it also benefits from the ability to market the presence of a
doctor and medical facilities aboard the ship.'
92
The court addressed the principle, presented in O'Brien and reiter-
ated in Barbetta, that a doctor's work is not the business of the cruise
line. In Rand v. Hatch,9 3 the Florida Third District Court of Appeal
held that general maritime law applies to a claim for a shipboard doc-
tor's malpractice. The Rand court based its assertion on the premise that
a shipboard doctor's medical malpractice "bears a significant relation-
ship to traditional maritime activity."' 94 Accordingly, in Rand, the court
determined that "[slick and injured crew and passengers, either left
untreated or inadequately treated, are certainly likely to disrupt maritime
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing Nietes v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 188 F. Supp. 219, 221 (N.D. Cal. 1959);
Fairley v. Royal Cruise Line, 1993 A.M.C. 1633, 1639 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Herschaft supra note 2,
at 593; Compagno, supra note 139, at 389-90). However, merely hiring a competent physician
and placing him onboard does not preclude the duty to exercise reasonable care toward the
passengers during the voyage. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 5 n.1.
187. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 5.
188. Id.
189. The average Carnival cruise ship holds approximately 2246 passengers. This figure is
derived by averaging the passenger capacity of the twenty Carnival ships currently in service. See
Fun Ships, Fun Ship Fleet, at http://www.carnival.cotiCMS/Ships/FunShips.aspx (last visited
Jan. 31, 2005).
190. There are approximately 258 recognized named populated areas (cities, towns, townships
etc.) in Florida with a population of 2000 or less. 2000 U.S. Census Information, at http://www.
census.gov. (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
191. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 6.
192. Id. at 2. As part of Dr. Neri's contract, he had to agree that his photograph and likeness
could be used in all media. It is reasonable to assume this included advertising media.
193. Rand v. Hatch, 762 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
194. Id. at 1002 (citing Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S.
527, 543 (1995) (providing the test used to determine whether a tort falls within the purview of
general maritime law); Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 365 (1990) (expanding upon the analysis
presented in Grubart)).
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activity, such as the successful navigation of a commercial vessel."' 95
The Carlisle court stated that maritime law embraced agency
law, 196 which in turn led to its final determination. The following illus-
trates a crucial step in the court's reasoning:
These principles [of agency] include that there is no inherent conflict
between a physician's contractual independent contractor status and a
finding of agency where the totality of the circumstances warrant[s]
[such a finding], . . and that a conclusory statement of independent
contractor status in a contract document is not necessarily
controlling. 197
The court initially looked to the amount of control Carnival main-
tained over Dr. Neri, noting that "the cruise line provides the medical
supplies, selects the nurses, sets the hours of operation of the infirmary,
and provides a policy and procedures manual for the operation of the
infirmary."198 In Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc.,' 99 the
Florida Supreme Court stated, "[w]hen considering a claim based on
agency, it is the right of control, not actual control that may be determi-
native." 2" Dr. Neri was an officer of the ship and subject to the ship's
articles. He was "to provide 'medical services and treatment to passen-
gers and crew in accordance with [Carnival's] Physician's guidelines,'
and he was subject to dismissal for 'failure to perform his duties to the
satisfaction of Carnival." 2° Despite the ancient rule that shipowners
are not in the business of treating passengers, the court concluded that
the record supported "a certain amount of control over the doctor's med-
ical services."2 2 This bridged the first gap, argued in O'Brien and
Barbetta, in the agency relationship for vicarious liability under respon-
deat superior.
The court also found that it was foreseeable that some passengers
would become ill, be injured, or have medical problems while at sea.2°3
Further, the only meaningful option was for the ailing passenger to seek
aid from the ship's doctor. The court found this lack of choice created
195. Rand, 762 So. 2d at 1002-03.
196. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 6 (citing Cactus Pipe & Supply Co. v. MN Montmarte, 756 F.2d
1103, 1111 (5th Cir. 1985); West India Indus., Inc. v. Vance & Sons AMC-Jeep, 671 F.2d 1384,
1387 (5th Cir. 1982)).
197. Id. at 6-7 (citing Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842, 853-54;
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 14N cmt. a; Smith v. Commodore Cruise Lines, Ltd., 124
F. Supp. 2d 150, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding ship's doctor was cruise line's agent, whose
knowledge of personal injury he treated is imputed to the cruise line)).
198. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 7.
199. Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2003).
200. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 7 (citing Villazon, 843 So. 2d at 853).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 7.
203. Id.
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control over the doctor-patient relationship, which was the second gap
argued in O'Brien and Barbetta regarding the agency relationship for
vicarious liability under respondeat superior. The facts, as stated above,
led the court to declare:
We reject the holding of the Barbetta line of cases and hold that the
cruise line's duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances
extends to the actions of the ship's doctor placed on board by the
cruise line. We accordingly hold that, regardless of the contractual
status ascribed to the doctor, for purposes of fulfilling the cruise
line's duty to exercise reasonable care, the ship's doctor is an agent
of the cruise line whose negligence should be imputed to the cruise
line. 2 4
After making this departure from the course chartered by the Barbetta
cases, the court pointed out that the cruise line is already vicariously
liable for the shipboard doctor's negligence in treatment of the other




Finally, the court analyzed the terms in the Carlisle's passenger
ticket, which disclaimed liability for the ship's doctor under 46 U.S.C.
app. § 183c(a). This statute makes it unlawful for the owner of a vessel
that transports passengers between ports of the United States or between
the United States and foreign ports to insert into any contract a dis-
claimer of liability for injury or death due to the negligence of the
owner's servants.2" Since the court concluded that the ship's doctor
was an agent (more specifically, a servant) of the cruise line, it was
unlawful to disclaim liability for the negligence of one of the ship's
servants. The court's holding rendered the disclaimer null and void.2 °7
In its final paragraph, the court described its view of the reality of
the cruise industry as follows:
A cruise ship is a city afloat with hundreds of temporary citizens,
some of whom are passengers and some of whom are employees and
204. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 8 (emphasis added).
205. Under general maritime law a shipowner is liable for the negligent treatment of a seaman,
regardless of the amount of control the cruise line can exert over the doctor's medical services or
the doctor-patient relationship. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 8 (citing De Zon v. Am. President Lines,
318 U.S. 660 (1943); De Centeno v. Gulf Fleet Crews, Inc., 798 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1986);
Cent. Gulf S.S. Corp. v. Sambula, 405 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1968); Fitzgerald v. A. L. Burbank &
Co., 451 F.2d 670, 679 (2d Cir. 1971)).
206. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c(a) (1958) (emphasis added); Carlisle v. Ulysses Lines, Ltd., 475
So. 2d 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that an exculpatory clause attempting to relieve a
cruise line from liability for negligence of its servants would be unlawful under 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 183c(a)); Fairley v. Royal Cruise Lines, 1993 A.M.C. 1633, 1641 n.7 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (citing 46
U.S.C. app. § 183c(a) for the proposition that the cruise line's disclaimer of liability for
physician's negligence did not as a matter of law preclude apparent authority claim at the motion
to dismiss stage).
207. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 8.
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agents of the cruise line who comprise the ship's crew, each of
whom, within their particular sphere, owe a duty of reasonable care
to the passengers.20 8
The rule of law espoused by the court was essentially that a cruise line
may be held vicariously liable under the theory of respondeat superior
for the negligence of the shipboard doctor.2 °9
On February 4, 2004, attorneys for Carnival sought rehearing of the
case in front of the Florida Third District Court of Appeal.2"' The same
three-judge panel, Senior Judge Nesbitt, Judge Cope, and Judge Rami-
rez, denied Carnival's motion for rehearing. The court declared that it
had passed on a question of great public importance and framed the
question as, "[w]hether a cruise line is vicariously liable for the medical
malpractice of the shipboard doctor, committed on a ship's passen-
ger?" 21  The denial of the rehearing by the Florida Third District Court
of Appeal raised the possibility for appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.
The Florida Constitution, article V, § 3, sets out the jurisdiction for the
Florida Supreme Court.21 2 In this particular case, it appears the Florida
Supreme Court would have jurisdictional grounds to hear the case.213
However, the language in the particular provision, which would grant
jurisdiction, uses the word "may," which is permissive.214 Therefore,
the court has discretion to hear the case. Carnival has appealed the case
to the Florida Supreme Court, and both parties have filed the appropriate
briefs.215
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE
The Carlisle case is significant because it called into question the
relationships between cruise lines and their passengers under maritime
law. For only the second time, a court permitted recovery despite the
long-standing general maritime principle that a shipowner is not vicari-





212. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
213. The Florida Constitution states that the Supreme Court "may review any decision of a
district court of appeal that passes upon a question certified by it to be of great public importance
.... " FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
214. Id.
215. See generally Carnival's Initial Brief, Carnival Corp. v. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d I (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2003) (No. SC04-393); Respondent's Answer Brief, Carnival Corp. v. Carlisle, 864 So.
2d I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (No. SC04-393); Carnival's Reply Brief, Carnival Corp. v.
Carlisle, 864 So. 2d I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (No. SC04-393).
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of the ship's doctor.2" 6 That principle has represented the general mari-
time law for over a century. Under the Barbetta line of cases, an injured
passenger's only direct recourse against the cruise line was to sue for
negligent hiring. If passengers wanted to recover for the doctor's mal-
practice, they could sue the doctor directly. However, Carlisle affords
passengers direct remedies against the cruise lines for a doctor's mal-
practice. These other remedies raise interesting issues, which merit
analysis.
This case is also significant because it addresses a conflict that
arises out of the Barbetta rule. By allowing passengers to sue the cruise
lines directly for medical malpractice, Carlisle dispelled the distinction
between passengers and crewmembers with respect to vicarious liability
for shipboard doctors.
Finally, Carnival, since the decision, has made significant changes
in its relationship with its passengers. Carnival recently changed both its
forum selection clause and its limitation of liability clause.217 These
changes affect a passenger's ability to pursue a claim against Carnival.
The Carlisle case highlights the inconsistencies with the current
state of the law. The perpetuation of the long-standing precedent of
maritime law challenges our notions of fairness and logic. This is why
although not following the decisions, other courts have praised courts
such as Nietes and Carlisle for their outcomes. The sections below dis-
cuss the current problems and inconsistencies with the ancient rule con-
cerning a ship's liability for its shipboard doctor as it is applied to
modern society.
A. Passenger Remedies Under Maritime Law
By providing a ship's doctor, the shipowner satisfies its duty of
reasonable care to its passengers if the shipowner chooses "a doctor who
is competent and duly qualified. ' 218 Thus, if the shipowner provides a
physician, a passenger cannot sue it directly for the actions of the doctor,
but only for failure to hire a competent one. However, the passenger can
sue the ship's doctor directly for malpractice. This section analyzes the
passenger's remedies under maritime law.
1. NEGLIGENT HIRING
Carlisle is significant because, along with Nietes, it argued for
another direct remedy against the cruise lines besides negligent hiring.
This is important because proving that a cruise line is liable for negligent
216. The first time a recovery was permitted was in the Nietes case. See supra Part III.B.
217. See supra Part V.C.
218. Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1371 (5th Cir. 1988).
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hiring is very difficult.21 9 Current law permits a cruise line to transfer its
duty to its passengers by relying on a hiring agency to determine
whether doctors are qualified to work on its ships.220 Herschaft argued
that it is logically inconsistent for courts to disclaim a carrier's ability to
supervise the doctor's actions, but deem that the carrier has enough
knowledge to discern what constitutes a competent doctor.22' As Her-
schaft also noted, the "majority of cruise ships fly foreign flags and, as
such, 'are exempt from accident reporting requirements, and... are not
obligated to reveal records of malpractice claims.'- 222 Given these cir-
cumstances, a passenger can neither discover whether any allegations of
negligence have been levied against a practitioner, nor whether reports
of negligent hiring against the cruise line have been documented. 223 A
cruise ship passenger cannot make a prima facie case for negligent hir-
ing without evidence that the employer breached its duty by hiring an
unqualified doctor. Due to a lack of reporting requirements, plaintiffs
face a seemingly insurmountable burden when collecting the necessary
facts to support their cases; thus, their cases may end by either a motion
to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.
Other commentators, Robert Peltz and Vincent Warger, argued that
cruise ships are subject to "[a] number of governmental standards [that]
... apply to cruise ships and their medical staffs. '224 They asserted that
all ships sailing to U.S. ports are subject to regulation by both the United
States Coast Guard and Public Health Services.225 One of these regula-
tions, the Vessel Sanitation Program, has "strict requirements for medi-
219. See Fairley v. Royal Cruise Line, 1993 A.M.C. 1663 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (granting cruise
line's motion to dismiss claim for negligent hiring); Nanz v. Costa Cruises, Inc., 1991 A.M.C. 48,
50 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (granting cruise line's motion for summary judgment as to negligent hiring
claim); Huntley v. Carnival Corp., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (granting cruise
line's motion to dismiss claim for negligent hiring); Jackson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 203 F.
Supp. 2d 1367, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (granting cruise line's motion to dismiss claim for negligent
hiring); Carlisle v. Carnival Corp., 864 So. 2d 1, 8 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming the
trial court's granting of cruise line's motion for summary judgment); Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1374
(affirming summary judgment in favor of cruise line as to negligent hiring claim); Doe v.
Celebrity Cruise Lines, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (granting cruise line's motion
to dismiss as to plaintiff's negligent hiring claim). But see Warren v. Ajax Navigation Corp. of
Monrovia, 1995 A.M.C. 2609, 2614 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (denying cruise line's motion for summary
judgment on negligent hiring issue).
220. Cent. Gulf S.S. Corp. v. Sambula, 405 F.2d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 1968).
221. Herschaft, supra note 2, at 583.
222. Id. at 585 (citing Marilyn Adams, Safety Standards Get an Overhaul, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 10, 1982, at BM21; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 30, Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 791 F.
Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
223. Id.
224. Robert D. Peltz & Vincent J. Warger, Medicine on the Sea, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J 425, 455
(2003).
225. Id. at 427-28.
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cal records keeping, quarantine and death and illness reports. 2 26
Assuming that ships are subjected to reporting requirements, plain-
tiffs still face the burden of meticulously investigating the hiring criteria
and procedures that the cruise line, or the companies to which they dele-
gate this duty, use to select doctors. 227 This burden is difficult because
even if a doctor makes a misdiagnosis after beginning work for the
cruise line, that information does not create an issue of fact as to the
cruise line's negligence in hiring the doctor.228 The court in Laubheim
established a cruise line's burden as follows: "In performing such duty,
it is bound only to the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, and is
not compelled to select and employ the highest skill and longest
experience.
'229
2. SUITS AGAINST THE SHIPBOARD DOCTOR
The Carlisle court's outcome avoided the inherent problems that
arise when plaintiffs seek redress directly from shipboard doctors. The
citizenship of the shipboard doctors and the characteristics of their field
create interesting obstacles for plaintiffs who wish to sue them person-
ally. As many ships' doctors are foreign nationals230 and are always at
sea, it is difficult to execute service of process against them, and even
more difficult to find personal jurisdiction. Adding to the difficulty of
obtaining service of process is the fact that cruise ships employ doctors
for short durations and often rotate them among ships and itineraries. 23'
In addition, doctors have far fewer resources than the cruise lines.232
In Pota v. Holtz, the cruise line's defense counsel tried to circum-
vent this remedy. Counsel for Royal Caribbean attempted to accept ser-
vice of process on the vessel and then claim that Liberian law (the law of
the flag of the vessel) applied.233 The court rejected this argument and
found that a vessel moored at the port in the City of Miami is within the
226. Id. at 455.
227. Herschaft, supra note 2, at 584.
228. Peltz & Warger, supra note 224, at 454.
229. Laubheim v. Netherland S.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 782 (N.Y. 1887).
230. See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1372 (5th Cir. 1988) (ship's doctor was
from the Philippines); Carlisle v. Carnival Corp., 864 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (ship's
doctor was from Greece); see also Peltz & Warger, supra note 224, at 427 (stating "few American
doctors want to spend months at sea each year").
231. See Peltz & Warger, supra note 224, at 451 (stating most cruise lines hire doctors for a
two-to-four month commitment).
232. According to the International Council of Cruise Lines, the average shipboard doctor's
salary is $50,000 a year. This is less than half of what the average land-based general practitioner
earns. See generally John Pain, Some Question Medical Care on Cruise Ships, Mi mi HERALD,
Jan. 25, 2004, at B3.
233. Pota v. Holtz, 852 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
[Vol. 59:295
HOPE FOR TEMPORARY CITIZENS
State of Florida, not Liberia.234
The Carlisle case claimed the passenger is "effectively faced with
having to engage in a game of personal jurisdiction and service of pro-
cess roulette" when suing a ship's doctor.2 35 This game of roulette often
leads to the difficult question of whether the doctor rendered the medical
services in Florida waters or on the high sea.2 36 The Carlisles sought
this form of redress, and two years after having filed the case against
Carnival they were still unable to serve process on Dr. Neri.237
B. Crewmembers' Rights vs. Passengers' Rights
The result in Carlisle closed the gap between cruise passengers'
rights and crewmembers' rights. The United States Supreme Court in
De Zon v. American President Lines2 38 established the gap when it
determined that a shipowner is liable for any negligence of the ship's
doctor in rendering medical services to a crewmember. 239 The Court
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, which had determined that a ship-
owner's duty to its crew ended when it exercised reasonable care in
securing a shipboard doctor.2 4° Ironically, the Court stated that
"[i]mmunity cannot be rested upon the ground that the medical service
was the seaman's and the doctor's business and the treatment not in
pursuance of the doctor's duty to the ship or the ship's duty to the sea-
man." 241 Furthermore, the Court affirmatively stated that the "doctor in
treating the seaman was engaged in the shipowner's business," and "was
performing the service because the ship employed him to do so, not
because the [seaman] did."242 The Court's statement contradicts the
rationale articulated in O'Brien. In fact, these propositions are the prin-
ciples that serve as the foundation of the Barbetta rule. Thus, current
maritime law presents a dichotomy where crewmembers have greater
rights than passengers.
The De Zon case is interesting given the breadth of case law with
opposite holdings for passengers. The Court addressed this issue in
footnote two of the case, declaring that courts have denied liability to
234. Id. at 382.
235. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 8 n.4.
236. See Rana v. Flynn, 823 So. 2d 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (finding personal
jurisdiction present where treatment was in Florida waters and there were multiple contacts with
the state); cf Elmund v. Mottershead, 750 So. 2d 736 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding no
personal jurisdiction over non-resident ship's doctor with insufficient Florida contacts).
237. Carlisle, 864 So. 2d at 8 n.4.
238. De Zon v. Am. President Lines, 318 U.S. 660, 665 (1943).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 664.
241. Id. at 666.
242. Id. at 668.
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passengers on those grounds.2 43 The Court cited the holdings of
Laubheim and O'Brien, stating that those decisions had influence on the
federal courts.24 It also cited The Great Northern, The Korea Maru,
Branch v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantque, and The Napolitan
Prince for the proposition that a steamship is not liable for the negli-
gence of its physician under statute or common law.24 5 It made no com-
ment as to the merits of that rationale as the passenger issue was not
before the Court. Admittedly, the Jones Act24 6 and the historic doctrine
of maintenance and cure247 provide crewmembers special protection.
Although this may explain why crewmembers have different rights than
passengers, those doctrines do not explain the logical contradiction
presented in De Zon.
C. Hedging Liability
The Carlisle case may have prompted Carnival to alter the lan-
guage in its forum selection clause in an attempt to avoid liability arising
from state trial courts that feel constrained to follow Carlisle's prece-
dent, and to escape liability predicated on the doctrine of apparent
agency.
Typically, cruise lines include forum selection clauses in their pas-
senger tickets, which at one time required plaintiffs to sue in any of the
courts in the State of Florida. 248  Three of the largest cruise lines are
243. Id. at 666 n.2.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. The Jones Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982) (providing crewmembers the right to
maintain an action at law, with a trial by jury, for injuries while in the course of their employee).
In Central Gulf Steamship Corp. v. Sambula, a crewmember sued the shipowner under the Jones
Act for negligence in rendering maintenance and cure for the negligence of the doctor, which
rendered the cure. Cent. Gulf S.S. Corp. v. Sambula, 405 F.2d 291, 302 (5th Cir. 1968). The
court stated, "[a]lthough Dr. Lee was an independent practitioner, his engagement by Central Gulf
in the discharge of its medical care duties to Sambula made him the agent of Central Gulf; and
thus his deficient medical treatment, therapy, and prescription are attributable to Central Gulf on
agency principles." Id.
247. In The Osceola, the Supreme Court articulated that a ship owed a crewmember a duty of
maintenance and cure. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1902).
When the seaman becomes committed to the service of the ship the maritime law
annexes a duty that no private agreement is competent to abrogate, and the ship is
committed to the maintenance and cure of the seaman for illness or injury during the
period of the voyage, and in some cases for a period thereafter.
De Zon, 318 U.S. at 667. The duty to provide medical care does not require the shipowner to
provide a doctor; however, a shipowner must divert its course, hail a passing ship or take any
other appropriate measures to ensure the crewmember is provided with care. Id. at 667-68.
248. The following is an excerpt from a Carnival Cruise Line ticket:
It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier that all disputes and
matters whatsoever arising, under, in connection with or incident to this Contract
[Vol. 59:295
HOPE FOR TEMPORARY CITIZENS
headquartered in Miami-Dade County. 49 Consequently, the circuit
courts of Miami were often the venue for suits against cruise lines.
However, at some point following the Carlisle decision, Carnival
changed the wording of its forum selection clause. This clause now
states:
It is agreed by and between the Guest and Carnival that all disputes
and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident
to this Contract or the Guest's cruise, including travel to and from the
vessel, shall be litigated, if at all, before the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami, or as to those
lawsuits to which the Federal Courts of the United States lack subject
matter jurisdiction, before a court located in Miami-Dade County,
Florida, U.S.A. to the exclusion of the Courts of any other county,
state or country.25°
Under the wording of the new clause, one can only sue in state
court in Miami-Dade County when the federal district courts do not have
jurisdiction to hear the case. A federal district court does not have origi-
nal jurisdiction where there is a lack of diversity of citizenship.25" ' For
example, the federal district court does not have diversity jurisdiction
over a case where the injured plaintiff resides in Florida, because the
three major cruise lines are also citizens of Florida for jurisdictional pur-
poses.252 A federal district court also fails to have original jurisdiction
when a plaintiffs cause of action did not arise "under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." '253 In a medical malpractice case
shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the State of Florida,
U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587 (1991); Cf Pota v. Holtz, 852 So. 2d 379,
380 n. 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that Royal Caribbean Cruise Line's ticket contained
a forum selection clause designating Miami-Dade County).
249. The following is a list of the three major cruise lines:
1. Carnival Cruise Line's corporate office is located at the following address:
3655 NW 87th Avenue
Miami, Florida 33178;




3. Norwegian Cruise Line's corporate office is located at the following address:
7665 Corporate Center Drive.
Miami, Florida 33126
Cruise line profiles, available at http://www.cruising.org (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
250. See Important Notices to Guests; Important Terms and Conditions of Contract, available
at http://www.carnival.com/CMS/StaticTemplates/ticket-contract.aspx (last visited Jan. 31,
2005) [hereinafter "Important Notices to Guests"].
251. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
252. See Important Notices to Guests, supra note 250.
253. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
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against a cruise line, it is doubtful that a passenger would satisfy the
requirements of federal question jurisdiction.254 Alternatively, plaintiffs
can bring their cases in federal court, without alleging diversity jurisdic-
tion, under the district court's original jurisdiction for admiralty, mari-
time and prize cases.255 However, they would most likely be reluctant to
do so, because plaintiffs pursuing claims in admiralty under Rule 9(h) in
federal court do not have a right to a trial by jury. 256 To avoid depriving
plaintiffs of their right to a jury trial, which in most cases would violate
the Seventh Amendment, 257 Carnival drafted its new forum selection
clause to allow non-diverse plaintiffs, who do not satisfy federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, to sue in a Florida state court, where they would
receive a trial by jury.258
Carnival also made another change to its passenger contract.
Sometime after the Cailisles went on their cruise, Carnival altered the
portion of its "Cruise Ticket Contract Terms" that limits its liability for
the negligence of independent contractors. The changes are apparent in
the following disclaimer:
13. (a) Guest acknowledges ... the ship's physician, nurse . . . are
either operated by or are independent contractors. Carnival neither
supervises nor controls their actions, nor makes any representation
either express or implied as to their suitability. Carnival, in arranging
for the services called for by the physician or nurse ... does so only
as a convenience for the Guest and Guests are free to use or not use
these services. Guest agrees that Carnival assumes no responsibility,
does not guarantee performance and in no event shall be liable for
any negligent or intentional acts or omissions, loss, damage, [or]
injury ... to Guest ... in connection with said services. Guests use
the services of all independent contractors at the Guest's sole risk.
Independent contractors are entitled to make a proper charge for any
service performed with respect to a Guest.
(b) Guest further acknowledges that although independent contractors
or their employees may use signage or clothing which contain the
254. However, crewmembers suing for medical malpractice of the shipboard doctor could
satisfy the requirements of federal question jurisdiction by suing under the Jones Act. See
Gonzalez v. M/V Destiny Panama, 203 F.R.D. 673, 675 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Sanders v. Seal
Fleet, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 729, 734 (E.D. Tex. 1998)); see also The Jones Act of 1902, 46 U.S.C.
app. § 688 (2000).
255. See 28 U.S.C § 1333 (2000); FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h).
256. See Gonzalez, 203 F.R.D. at 675 (finding that if a plaintiff sues in federal court and
alleges admiralty jurisdiction under Rule 9(h) there will ordinarily not be a jury trial); see also
Neenan v. Carnival Corp., No. 99-2658-CIV-LENARD, 2001 WL 91542, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(holding that because a plaintiff brought the claim in admiralty under Rule 9(h), Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 38(e) removed the right to trial by jury).
257. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
258. See generally Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 440 (2001) (finding
trial by jury is an obvious example of the remedies saved to suitors under 28 U.S.C. § 1333).
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name "Carnival" or other related trade names or logos, the indepen-
dent contractor status remains unchanged. Independent contractors,
their employees and assistants are not agents, servants or employees
of Carnival and have no authority to act on behalf of Carnival. 9
The changes seem to address legal issues and plant defenses to prevent
potential suits from plaintiffs under the doctrine of apparent agency.
V. THE COMMENT
While the Carlisle case has many strengths, such as addressing new
elements of control and noting significant policy arguments, the case
suffers from a fatal flaw. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal is a
state court. As such, once it determined that admiralty jurisdiction
existed, it was bound to apply, and not alter, the well-settled general
maritime law. The court was not free to survey available precedent and
render a decision it saw fit; it was to abide by the rule enunciated in
Barbetta.
This section comments on the courts holding. Part A addresses
issues of federal pre-emption of state courts to alter maritime law. Part
B discusses how the court's holding was pre-empted by federal maritime
law. Part C discusses the holding in relation to state law. Part D pro-
poses an alternate holding for the court, and analyzes that rationale.
Lastly, Part E discusses two ways the rationale espoused in Carlisle
could become part of the general maritime law.
A. Maritime Law is Federal Common Law
Once a court has determined that admiralty jurisdiction exists, the
court is bound to apply general maritime law.260 General maritime law
is federal common law.26 1 Congress has the power to create maritime
law, which prevails throughout the country. 262 When no congressional
legislation addresses a maritime issue, "the general maritime law, as
accepted by the federal courts, constitutes part of [the] national law,
applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
' 263
Therefore, Congress and the federal courts are the two bodies that are
259. See Important Notices to Guests, supra note 250.
260. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 854 (1986);
Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Branch v. Schumann, 445 F.2d 175
(5th Cir. 1971).
261. See Chelentis v. Luckenbach, 247 U.S 372, 381 (1918); accord Robert D. Peltz, The Myth
of Uniformity in Maritime Law, 21 TUL. MAR. L. J. 103, 103 (1996) ("The first lesson that every
law student studying Admiralty I learns is that, although most maritime suits may be filed in state
court, they are nevertheless governed by federal substantive maritime law to maintain the
uniformity which is necessary for a national maritime law.").
262. See Chelentis, 274 U.S. at 381.
263. Id. (emphasis added).
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permitted to create or alter maritime law. Where there is a lack of statu-
tory or judicially created maritime principles regarding a specific legal
issue, courts may apply state law insofar as such application does not
frustrate the national interest in preserving uniformity in maritime
law. 26
The Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen265 set forth
the following standard to define which state laws conflict with maritime
law: if the state law "works material prejudice to the characteristic fea-
tures of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony
and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations. 266
When and only when there is lack of maritime law controlling an issue,
a court may reach out to those principles of law it deems both persuasive
and appropriate. 267  Even though a state court may adopt portions of
state law while exercising admiralty jurisdiction, it may not make
changes to substantive maritime law.268 Whether parties litigate a case
in federal or state court, if jurisdiction exists, the court must apply mari-
time law and any conflicting state law is pre-empted. Carlisle was heard
in the Florida Third District Court of Appeal, and as a state court, it was
bound to follow the general maritime law since the federal courts had
previously established well-entrenched law on the issue. Therefore,
because Barbetta and its progeny had previously precluded recovery
under the theory of repondeat superior, the Carlisle court could not hold
the cruise line liable under this theory. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., correctly refused to disturb the
well-established maritime principle "that the negligence of a shipboard
doctor in treating passengers is not to be imputed to the ship's owner or
operator." 26 9 Unlike the court in Cummiskey, the Carlisle court usurped
authority and refused to apply well-established maritime law.270
264. See Coastal Fuels Mktg, Inc. v. Fla. Express Shipping Co., 207 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11 th Cir.
2000).
265. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
266. Id. at 216.
267. See Hilton Oil Transport v. Oil Transport Co., 659 So. 2d 1141, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995); accord Peltz, supra note 261, at 110.
268. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 221-22 (1986) (citing Madruga v.
Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560-61 n.12 (1954)); see also Norwegian Cruise Lines, Ltd. v.
Zareno, 712 So. 2d 791, 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ("Thus state courts may entertain maritime
causes of action and may apply state law to supplement federal maritime law if the state law does
not conflict with federal law or interfere with uniformity.").
269. Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 895 F.2d 107, 108 (2d Cir. 1990).
270. The Carlisle court did not address the issue of federal pre-emption of maritime law in its
opinion. Carnival first brought this issue to the court's attention in its motion for rehearing. See
Respondent's Answer Brief at 6, Carlisle v. Carnival Corp., 864 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (SC04-393).
[Vol. 59:295
HOPE FOR TEMPORARY CITIZENS
B. The Court Overstepped its Boundaries
The Carlisle court declared that the shipboard doctor was an agent
of the cruise line, and that the cruise line was vicariously liable for the
torts of the ship's doctor. As a threshold matter, since the Barbetta line
of cases precluded such recovery and the Barbetta rule was well-
entrenched maritime precedent, the Carlisle court was pre-empted from
holding the cruise line vicariously liable under the theory of respondeat
superior.17 ' While the court's decision imposing vicarious liability on
the cruise line may be just and correct given the commercial realities of
the cruise industry, a state appellate court cannot formulate such an
alteration to the general maritime law.272 Moreover, a state appellate
court may not provide a remedy that "interfere[s] with the proper har-
mony and uniformity of [maritime law]. 2 7 3 In the absence of a statute,
the judiciary develops maritime law, but it is the federal courts that
shape the general maritime law.274 The United States Supreme Court
has stressed the need for uniformity within the general maritime law.
275
The argument for changing the Barbetta rule is persuasive, but either
Congress or the federal judiciary must execute this reform. Carlisle dis-
rupted uniformity and interfered with the proper harmony of maritime
law.
Setting aside the pre-emption issue, the Carlisle court issued a
well-reasoned opinion regarding vicarious liability under the theory of
respondeat superior. Since the Florida Third District Court of Appeal's
decision, Carlisle has received attention from a federal trial court in the
Southern District of Florida. In Huntley v. Carnival Corp.,2 76 the court
cited Carlisle in a suit against a cruise line for medical malpractice
based on actual or apparent agency.277 Judge King cited Carlisle, stat-
ing, "[i]n a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the Carlisle Court
rejected Barbetta's finding that a passenger at sea has any meaningful
control over his or her relationship with the ship's doctor .... "278 The
court in Huntley took the same approach as the court did in Fairley,
holding, "based on the record before the Court and the persuasiveness of
the above-cited case law, this Court is unable to conclude that [the]
Plaintiff will be unable to establish any set of facts entitling her to
271. See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1372 (5th Cir. 1988).
272. See Zareno, 712 So. 2d at 793.
273. Latman v. Costa Cruise Lines, 758 So. 2d 699, 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Am.
Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 452 (1994)).
274. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 572-78 (1847).
275. Id. at 575.
276. Huntley v. Carnival Corp, 307 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
277. Id. at 1373-75.
278. Id. at 1374 (citing Carlisle v. Carnival Corp., 864 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
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relief.' 279 Thus, the court praised Carlisle for its reasoning, but took the
safe approach to avoid the federal pre-emption issue, as in Fairley.
C. The Court's Holding is Consistent with State Law
Given that the Carlisle court correctly found that admiralty juris-
diction existed, it was bound to apply substantive maritime law, which is
federal common law. However, if admiralty jurisdiction had not existed
and the court was to decide the case under Florida substantive law, its
decision would stand consistent with such law.
The holding in Carlisle is consistent with the Florida Supreme
Court's jurisprudence regarding shore side medical malpractice. In Vil-
lazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc.,280 the Florida Supreme
Court was confronted with the issue of whether a patient's treating phy-
sicians were the HMO's agents, thereby subjecting the HMO to vicari-
ous liability under the theory of respondeat superior.281 In Villazon, the
court stated "[t]he existence of an agency relationship is normally one
for the trier of fact to decide. 282 Furthermore, summary judgment is
inappropriate "unless the facts are so crystallized that nothing remains
but questions of law."283
When determining whether an agency relationship existed, the
court should look not only to actual control.2 84 "It is the right to control,
rather than actual control that may be determinative. '285  In fact,
depending upon the totality of circumstances, independent contractors
can become agents subject to vicarious liability under the theory of
respondeat superior.286 According to the contracts in Villazon, the phy-
sicians were independent contractors of the HMOs.287 Nevertheless, the
court contended that contractual status did not preclude a finding of
agency.288 The court found that the record evidence provided a "signifi-
cant indicia of [the defendants'] right to control the means by which
medical services were rendered by [the physicians to the patients]. 289
In arriving at its holding, the court considered the reality of the HMO
industry and how it changed the medical profession in a way the legal
279. Id. at 1375.
280. Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2003).
281. Id. at 850-51.
282. Id. at 852.
283. Id. at 853 (citing Shaffran v. Holness, 93 So. 2d 94, 97-98 (Fla. 1957)).
284. Id. at 853.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. id. at 845-46.
288. Id. at 853.
289. Id. at 854.
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system could not ignore.290 Furthermore, the court found that "the prism
through which we consider and evaluate issues of control must be
honed," taking into context the reality of the industry.
291
It seems the Carlisle court incorrectly operated under the Villazon
rationale. It considered the reality of the cruise industry and viewed
control through that lens. It closely reviewed the record and determined,
as did Villazon, that independent contractor status did not prevent a find-
ing of agency. The Carlisle court reviewed the record to find that Carni-
val exerted control over the doctor-patient relationship. As stated in
Villazon, "[t]he facts peculiar to each case must govern the ultimate dis-
position. 292 While consistent with Florida law, the court failed to apply
the proper well-settled general maritime law as articulated in Barbetta.
D. Alternative Rationale: Apparent Agency
The Carlisle court could have reached the same end result by
applying the doctrine of apparent agency instead of respondeat superior.
As the Fairley court noted, Barbetta does not preclude a plaintiff from
bringing an action under the doctrine of apparent agency.293 Further, a
plaintiff could recover on that theory despite the majority rule. Proof of
apparent agency would allow recovery even though the shipboard doctor
was an independent contractor.294 Even a state court can make such a
finding because there is no clear maritime rule that precludes recovery
on the theory of apparent agency. Although Warren decided the issue,
that is only the decision of one district court in Florida. 295 Further, Fair-
ley declared that such recovery might be possible under the right set of
facts.29 6 Given the lack of attention by Congress and the absence of
judicially created maritime law governing this issue, the Carlisle court
was not pre-empted from reversing summary judgment on the ground of
apparent agency.




293. See Fairley v. Royal Cruise Line, 1993 A.M.C. 1633, 1639 (S.D. Fla. 1993); see also
Walter T. Johnson & Ann Gray Miller, New Developments in Cruise Law, 7 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 111,
125 (1994) (noting that Fairley suggested the cruise line may be liable for the doctor's malpractice
on an agency-by-estoppel theory). Even before Fairley, one commentator suggested that courts
can respect the doctrine of stare decisis and find the cruise lines liable for the negligence of their
doctors by adopting the theories articulated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 and
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429. Herschaft, supra note 2, at 594.
294. Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1640.
295. See Peltz, supra note 261, at 114 (declaring that in absence of a decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court or the controlling circuit court of appeals, the federal district courts are free to go
their own way).
296. Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1640.
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the apparent agency. A finding of apparent authority is essential to lia-
bility under the theory of apparent agency. "Apparent authority is dis-
tinguished from actual authority because it is the manifestation of the
principal to the third person rather than to an agent that is control-
ling. '297 The elements of apparent authority are: (1) conduct by the
principal, which causes the third party to believe that the principal con-
sents to the acts done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for
him, and (2) reasonable interpretation by the third party.29 8 Once appar-
ent authority is established, the principal is subject to liability under the
doctrine of apparent agency.299
Warren is the only case in Florida that fully analyzed a claim
against a shipowner based on apparent agency; therefore, a comparison
is edifying. Carnival's actions were sufficient to create the apparent
authority of Dr. Neri to act on its behalf. On each occasion that Dr. Neri
treated Elizabeth, he wore a Carnival Cruise Lines name tag and what
appeared to be an officer's uniform.3" The Carlisles did not pay Dr.
Neri directly, but used their "Sail and Sign card," and Carnival employ-
ees processed and billed the payment. 30 1 The Carlisles also knew there
was going to be a doctor onboard the ship, which affected their decision
to go on the cruise.3 °2 Had Carnival not provided medical facilities they
would not likely have taken the cruise with Carnival.3"3
In Warren, the plaintiff asserted that the cruise line held out the
ship's doctor as an agent by publishing a sales brochure that stated a
certified doctor would be aboard the ship.3" Further, the plaintiff in
Warren testified that his selection of that cruise was based solely on cost
and availability, not the status of the ship's doctor.3"5 With respect to
the representations made by the cruise line and reliance by the plaintiff,
Warren is distinguishable from Carlisle because of the additional facts
regarding manifestations that were present in Carlisle.
297. Cactus Pipe & Supply Co. v. IvV Montmarte, 756 F.2d 1103, 1111 (5th Cir. 1985).
298. See id.; Warren v. Ajax Navigation Corp., 1995 A.M.C. 2609, 2611 (S.D. Fla. 1995);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958).
299. See also Warren, 1995 A.M.C. at 2611; Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1640 n.6:
One who represents that another is his agent or other agent and thereby causes a
third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agency is
subject to liability to the third party for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of
the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958)).





304. See Warren, 1995 A.M.C. at 2612.
305. Id. at 2613.
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As a result of the manifestations by Carnival, the Carlisles reasona-
bly believed that Carnival consented to have Dr. Neri perform medical
services on its behalf. The limitation of liability provision contained in
the passenger ticket and cruise brochure did not automatically make the
Carlisle's belief unreasonable.3 °6 Further, the Carlisles relied to their
detriment because Elizabeth suffered injuries due to the negligence of
the shipboard doctor. Since the cruise line made such representations
and Dr. Nefi appeared to be an agent, Carnival is potentially subject to
liability to the Carlisles for the negligent conduct of the doctor.3 °7 In
Warren, the plaintiff only pointed out that the cruise line issued a bro-
chure and admitted that the ship's doctor did not factor into the plain-
tiffs decision to take the cruise. Therefore, the plaintiff in Warren
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact and his claim was dis-
posed of at the summary stage.308 Given the additional facts presented
by the Carlisles, it is likely that their claim would have survived sum-
mary judgment.
Since maritime law did not control the issue of liability based on
apparent agency, the Carlisle court could have looked to state law for
guidance on the issue.3°9 Florida courts have used the following test to
determine apparent agency: (1) whether there was a representation by
the principal; (2) whether a third party relied on that representation; and
(3) whether the third party changed position in reliance upon the repre-
sentation and suffered detriment.
310
If the Carlisle court had decided the case based on apparent agency,
in finding a genuine issue of material fact as to that claim, the court
would not have materially altered general maritime law. This would
have taken much of the controversy out of the decision. Opponents
most likely could have argued only that Carnival's representations were
insufficient to establish a question of fact to preclude summary judg-
ment. Instead, the Carlisle decision, based on the theory of respondeat
superior, is subject to the much stronger criticism that it materially
changed general maritime law.
On the other hand, a finding of apparent agency would allow the
306. The passenger contract in Fairley contained a similar limitation of liability provision and
the court determined that it would not dispose of the plaintiffs case on a motion to dismiss.
Fairley, 1993 A.M.C. at 1640.
307. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267, cmt. a (1958) (stating "[t]he rule
normally applies where the plaintiff has submitted himself to the care or protection of an apparent
servant in response to an invitation from the defendant to enter into such relations with such
servant").
308. Warren, 1995 A.M.C. at 2614.
309. See Coastal Fuels Mktg, Inc. v. Fla. Express Shipping Co., 207 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11 th Cir.
2000); accord Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340-41 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
310. Ramos v. Preferred Med. Plan, Inc., 842 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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cruise lines to discontinue their outward representations, preventing
future claims of apparent agency. The doctrine of apparent agency is
based on the outward manifestations by the principal, reasonable reli-
ance by the third party, and a loss caused by that reliance. The claim
fails if any one of these elements is missing. A cruise line seeking to
avoid liability under this theory could take actions to eliminate those
elements. For example, if the facts of the case were more analogous to
Warren, or Dr. Neri wore civilian clothes, did not wear a Carnival name
tag, and received payment directly from the Carlisles, the case would
most likely be disposed of by a motion for summary judgment. How-
ever, it is unlikely that Carnival would allow a staff member to not wear
a uniform. Additionally, Carnival could attack the reasonable reliance
element, as it seems to have attempted to do in its newest disclaimer.311
In the newest version of its limitation of liability notice to guests,
Carnival provides much more detail explaining how it is not liable for
the actions of the shipboard doctor.3"' Carnival explains that it does not
control the doctor's actions and that the doctor is placed on the ship for
the convenience of the guests.3 3 Despite the fact that the doctors wear
Carnival uniforms, nametags, and use Carnival logos or signage, they
are still independent contractors.314 Thus, a cruise line could possibly
circumvent a decision in the future based on apparent agency.
E. Two Prospects of Re-establishing Uniformity
Admittedly, the Carlisle court's arms were tied, save for possible
recovery under the doctrine of apparent agency. To solve this legal
conundrum, either Congress or the Supreme Court must address the
issue of whether a shipowner is liable for the medical malpractice of the
shipboard doctor. Currently, neither body has addressed the issue.
Given the persuasive arguments in favor of change and the need for
uniformity in the field of maritime law, a decision from either body is
long overdue.
1. LEGISLATIVE ATTENTION
As stated in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, "Congress has para-
mount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail
throughout the country."'3 15 The ability of Congress to preserve uni-




315. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1917).
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formity in maritime law is exemplified in the Jones Act of 1920.316 The
Jones Act regulates crewmembers' remedies against their employers
uniformly. "The Jones Act was intended to achieve 'uniformity in the
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction' by giving seamen a federal right to
recover from their employers for negligence regardless of the location of
the injury or death.
317
In her article, Herschaft argued that the legislature could address
the issue by clarifying the shipboard doctor's position as an employee of
the ship. 318 Given the Carlisle court's persuasive arguments for suffi-
cient control to allow a claim for vicarious liability under the theory of
repondeat superior, such a legislative change would seem consistent
with the current realities of the cruise industry.
Another possible solution is for the legislature to amend and clarify
46 U.S.C. app. § 183c(a). 3 19 The legislature could define the term "ser-
vants" clearly to include shipboard doctors, nurses and any medical
staff. Then, if the cruise lines attempted to limit liability for the negli-
gence of the medical staff, such limitations would be contrary to 46
U.S.C. app. § 183c(a), and thus void.
2. A SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen also
addressed the situation where Congress has not provided a controlling
statute in an area of maritime law. "[I]n the absence of some controlling
statute, the general maritime law, as accepted by our Federal courts,
constitutes part of our national law, applicable to matters within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. ' 32 ° A decision by the United States
Supreme Court could enact change while maintaining uniformity in mar-
itime law. In fact, the Court has enacted change in maritime law in the
area of maritime remedies, as illustrated by Moragne v. State Marine
Lines, Inc.321
316. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
317. Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401 (1970).
318. See Herschaft, supra note 2, at 592 (arguing that the legislature could change the language
of 46 U.S.C. § 8302(c) (1985) by adding "and the physician, as a staff member, is to be regarded
as an employee of the ship").
319. A commentator, when discussing the Fairley decision, noted that the court raised the issue
of 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c(a) when criticizing the Barbetta rule. She stated, "[olnly time will tell
whether this decision will result in another congressional 'technical clarification.'" Karen C.
Hildebrant, Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Remedies for Maritime Passengers, 68 TUL. L.
REV. 403, 416 (1994). Her comment astutely pointed out that a clarification of 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 183c(a) could remedy the tension between the statute and the Barbetta rule.
320. S. Pac. Co., 244 U.S. at 215 (1917) (emphasis added).
321. Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). In (United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co.), the Court also reversed another long standing maritime precedent. United States v.
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In Moragne, the Court analyzed the ancient rule espoused by The
Harrisburg322 in 1886, which prevented a seaman's estate from recover-
ing for wrongful death caused by a violation of a maritime duty. The
Court in Moragne analyzed the basis for the rule enunciated in The Har-
risburg and found that it rested on an antiquated principle of English law
that no longer applied to American maritime law. This led the Court to
state that "[w]e accordingly overrule The Harrisburg, and hold that an
action does lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation
of maritime duties. 323
While the Court overruled a long-standing maritime precedent, it
maintained uniformity. "Our recognition of a right to recover for
wrongful death under general maritime law will assure uniform vindica-
tion of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies that
have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes
to exclusively maritime substantive concepts. 3 24 There, the Court
noted that its decision was necessary to preserve uniformity in maritime
law, and to avoid state courts applying state law to maritime issues. The
Court found that such uniformity is consistent with "the constitutionally
based principle that federal admiralty law should be 'a system of law
coextensive with and operating uniformly in, the whole country.' "325
Since the court in Carlisle decided "an important question of fed-
eral law that has not been, but should be settled by [the United States
Supreme Court]," the parties could appeal the decision to it. 326 How-
ever, certiorari is discretionary, so the Court would have to decide
whether to restore uniformity to maritime law or leave it in a state of
flux. Given the persuasive nature of the arguments asserted in Carlisle,
the issue is ripe for consideration by the Court, as was the rule under The
Harrisburg in Moragne.
VI. THE CONCLUSION
A problem arises when passengers are injured or become ill while
at sea. A cruise passenger's situation is distinct from that of a guest at a
shore side hotel, in that a passenger at sea does not have the option of
which doctor to visit. The passenger has no control over the doctor-
patient relationship. The cruise line does have control over who prac-
tices medicine on the ship. Cruise lines do not employ a variety of doc-
Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (finding the doctrine of divided damages no longer
applied in maritime law).
322. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
323. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409.
324. Id. at 401.
325. Id. at 402 (citing The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558 (1874)).
326. Sup. CT. R. 10.
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tors from different backgrounds and different medical schools, from
which the passenger can make a meaningful choice. Rather, they pro-
vide one or two doctors from the backgrounds and medical schools of
the cruise line's choice. Ultimately, the cruise line chooses the doctor
for the passenger, leaving the passenger with no control over the doctor-
patient relationship. The Carlisle court raised these important policy
arguments in its opinion.
Not only do cruise lines make the choice for the passengers, they
benefit from this by advertising that medical care is provided onboard.
Furthermore, if a cruise line does not provide a doctor in the case of an
emergency, it may have to divert the ship or take other reasonable
actions in order to satisfy its duty of reasonable care to the passenger.
If a passenger is in need of immediate medical attention, options
such as an air-evacuation or diversion are not only very expensive, but
could be ineffective because they take a considerable amount of time
which is not always available in emergency situations. Moreover, leav-
ing the ship and flying home to seek medical care is not always an
option in emergencies. Carlisle argued that the current state of maritime
law creates a situation where a cruise ship passenger either accepts the
cruise line's choice of doctor, or goes without medical care. For a pas-
senger who is ill or injured, that is no meaningful choice.
In Nietes, Fairley, Carlisle, and now Huntley, the courts recognized
these realities of the cruise industry. This realization may have been one
of the driving forces that caused those courts to depart from Barbetta, or
look for ways for passengers to recover without actually departing from
the rule. Given their holdings, it is reasonable to assume that those
courts saw a need for change. Importantly, they recognized salient pol-
icy arguments in favor of change.
A number of commentators have also expressed a need for change.
Compagno's article characterized the Barbetta opinion as "slavishly fol-
lowed" and "outmoded." '327 He also stated that the "Fifth Circuit lost an
opportunity to properly analyze the special circumstances inherent in the
passenger shipowner-ship's doctor relationship ... 328 Herschaft's
article also criticized the validity of Barbetta. She stated in her closing
remarks that "[a]dmiralty courts no longer need to steer by the star of
stare decisis in the field of cruise ship medical malpractice cases,
because in the long run, both the cruise industry and its passengers will
reap the benefits of prudent change. 329 She also characterized the
327. Compagno, supra note 139, at 391.
328. Id.
329. Herschaft, supra note 2, at 594-95.
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Nietes opinion as "well-reasoned."33 The Nietes opinion was also
highly regarded by a well-known scholar in the field of admiralty and
maritime law, Martin J. Norris,3 3 ' who claimed Judge Sweigert's opin-
ion was "excellent" and advocated change in light of modem trends of
tort liability. 33' A San Francisco attorney, who specializes in travel law,
characterized the Carlisle decision as "inevitable.' 333
The argument for change is persuasive. However, the need for uni-
formity in maritime law is also compelling. The status of the current
law in Florida leaves maritime law in flux. 3 34 Trial courts in Miami-
Dade and Monroe Counties in Florida may opt to follow Carlisle, while
other courts in Florida or courts in other jurisdictions, such as Texas or
New York, will most likely apply Barbetta. This patchwork body of law
contradicts the spirit of general maritime law and the framers' intent. It
is for this reason that no other court besides Nietes, until Carlisle,
departed from the rule.
Maritime law is unique because it is federal common law. Mari-
time law cannot be analogized to the laws of the states, because by defi-
nition each state creates and maintains its own substantive law without
the requirement of, or need for, national uniformity. In contrast, general
maritime law must be nationally uniform and modified only by Con-
gress or the federal courts. As with the rule of The Harrisburg, which
reigned from 1886 to 1970 when it was overruled in Moragne, courts
must continue to implement the well-established law enunciated in
Barbetta until the correct entity effectuates uniform change.
Given the arguably controlling nature of the Carlisle decision, in a
jurisdiction that houses three of the world's major cruise lines, the case
hopefully will serve as the necessary vehicle to raise interest in Con-
gress, or provide the stakes for the parties to pursue the outcome up to
the United States Supreme Court. Ideally, the Supreme Court will
address the issue and enact the seemingly inevitable change articulated
in Carlisle, while maintaining a uniform body of general maritime law.
Ultimately, regardless of the eventual outcome, Carlisle provided hope
for temporary citizens aboard floating cities.
330. Id. at 594.
331. See Pace, supra note 129.
332. NORRIS, supra note 130, at 72.
333. Catherine Wilson, Cruise Line Faces Revived Lawsuit: An Appeals Court Reinstated a
Medical Malpractice Case Against Carnival, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 2003, at B2.
334. This is not to argue that the need for change should bow to uniformity, because change
can be implemented and uniformity maintained if the appropriate entity effectuates it.
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